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I CAME, ITAR, I CONQUERED: THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS 
REGULATIONS, 3D-PRINTED FIREARMS, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Abstract: The rise of 3D printers presents unique regulatory challenges in many 
areas, particularly firearm regulations. The Texas non-profit, Defense Distributed, 
successfully developed a 3D printable lower receiver for the AR-15 assault rifle 
and a 3D .380 pistol capable of firing eight rounds. Current regulations cannot 
meaningfully govern the 3D printing of guns without an effective means of control-
ling and standardizing the distribution of the CAD files online. This Note argues 
that the existing regulatory scheme, which governs the dissemination of technical 
data related to firearms, unconstitutionally restricts expression. The regulatory 
scheme gives broad discretion to licensing officials, and fails to provide the neces-
sary procedural protections for a licensing system that operates as a prior restraint 
on speech, including prompt judicial review. The International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (“ITAR”) and the First Amendment thus create a constitutional catch-
22 because courts will likely decline to engage in judicial review of licensing de-
terminations under the political question doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its initial development in the 1980s, three-dimensional (“3D”) print-
ing, or “additive manufacturing,” has steadily become more consumer friendly, 
as the cost and necessary expertise has diminished.1 Consumer 3D printing 
works by utilizing Computer Aided Design (“CAD”) files.2 Much like a conven-
tional paper printer, the 3D printer requires “ink” to produce the desired design, 
except the ink required for 3D printers is typically plastic.3 The 3D printer re-
                                                                                                                           
 1 HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D PRINTING, THE PROM-
ISE AND PERIL OF A MACHINE THAT CAN MAKE (ALMOST) ANYTHING, 8, 11–12, 85–89 (Mary Beth 
Wakefield et al. eds., 2013) (stating that 3D printing will give people with “modest bank accounts” man-
ufacturing power previously limited to large scale production); Mark Gibbs, The End of Gun Control?, 
FORBES.COM, July 28, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/markgibbs/2012/07/28/the-end-of-gun-
control/, archived at http://perma.cc/KN2E-S7RM (stating that 3D printers—formerly rare, expensive, 
and difficult to use products—have become less expensive). 
 2 Ashlee Vance, The Wow Factor of 3-D Printing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, at B10 (stating that 
3D printers work by utilizing designs contained in CAD files); see LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 1, 
at 11. 
 3 See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 1, at 11, 77. 3D printing began with simple widgets, but the 
technology is now capable of producing complex devices from many materials, albeit often with some 
assembly required. See id. at 13, 71. Many sites where CAD files are available will also have instruc-
tions for assembly, such as Defense Distributed’s website, defcad.org, before the State Department 
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ceives its instructions from the CAD file, and either solidifies or excretes the 
powder or liquid ink.4 Some 3D printers are able to print metal objects, such as 
hardware, medical instruments, and even firearms.5 These metal printers are far 
more expensive than their plastic-based counterparts, and require more expertise 
to operate.6 
Due to the increasing ease of use and decreasing cost, 3D printing has the 
potential for both significant social benefits and dangers.7 In the medical field, 
for example, “bioprinting” has the potential to fundamentally alter the processes 
in place for organ donation; provide new, invaluable opportunities for the study 
of disease; and dramatically increase accessibility to functional prosthetic 
limbs.8 Simultaneously, the greater ease and decreased expense of 3D printing of 
medical devices could create opportunities for the proliferation of products that 
have not undergone regulatory scrutiny for safety or effectiveness.9 
                                                                                                                           
required the files’ removal. See The Turbo Entabulator—A 3D-Printable, Fully Mechanical Comput-
er, THINGIVERSE (June 9, 2013), http://www.thingiverse.com/thing:101105/#instructions, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4VC7-4S3W. 
 4 See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 1, at 12. Some have used plastic 3D printers to print mechan-
ical computers and even functional prosthetics. See Dad Uses 3D Printer to Make His Son a Prosthetic 
Hand, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/04/dad-prints-
prosthetic-hand-leon-mccarthy_n_4214217.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3WN-BFC8; THINGI-
VERSE, supra note 3. 
 5 Doug Gross, Texas Company Makes Metal Gun with 3-D Printer, CNN, Nov. 8, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/08/tech/innovation/3d-printed-metal-gun/, archived at http://perma.cc/
8C5S-JJ75 (discussing the first ever fully 3D-printed metal gun); Metal 3D Printing, GPI PROTOTYPE 
& MFG. SERVS., INC., http://gpiprototype.com/services/metal-3d-printing.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/XS7V-AYEN (last visited Sept. 4, 2014) (providing examples of various products currently 
printed and sold by a metal 3D printing company). 
 6 See Gross, supra note 5 (stating that a 3D metal printer costs more than a private university 
education and require expert engineers to operate). 
 7 See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 1, at 3, 223 (discussing the possibility of black markets for 
3D-printed organs); Davis Doherty, Note, Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a Roadblock to 
the 3D Printing Revolution, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 360–62 (2012) (suggesting that a new legal 
framework is necessary to address the challenges presented by 3D printing to intellectual property 
law); Peter Jensen-Haxel, Comment, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and the Right to 
Build Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 447, 463–69 (2012) (arguing 
that 3D printed firearms have the potential to render existing gun regulation ineffective). 
 8 See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 1, at 7; Seung-Schik Yoo & Samuel Polio, 3D On-Demand 
Bioprinting for the Creation of Engineered Tissues, in CELL AND ORGAN PRINTING, 3, 4 (Bradley R. 
Ringeisen, Barry J. Spargo & Peter K. Wu, eds., 2010); Makoto Nakamura, Reconstruction of Biolog-
ical Three-Dimensional Tissues: Bioprinting and Biofabrication Using Inkjet Technology, in CELL 
AND ORGAN PRINTING, supra, at 23, 23–26. 
 9 See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that individuals could use 3D printing to 
manufacture illegal weapons or toxic drugs and that 3D printers are already capable of printing some 
medical devices, such as hearing aids); Jensen-Haxel, supra note 7, at 451–53, 463–69 (discussing 
medical applications of 3D printers, and arguing that 3D-printed firearms will render existing gun 
regulations obsolete). 
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Similar issues arise with respect to 3D-printed firearms.10 Defense Distrib-
uted, a Texas non-profit, recently designed a lower receiver for an AR-15 rifle, 
capable of firing over 600 rounds, and placed the CAD file on its website.11 
There are also at least two functional models of handguns, printed almost entire-
ly by 3D printers.12 One of these pistols, the Liberator, is a plastic handgun, ca-
pable of firing .380 caliber bullets.13 The pistol’s design includes a steel chunk, 
solely to comply with the recently extended Undetectable Firearms Act, which 
prohibits firearms that do not set off metal detectors.14 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Jensen-Haxel, supra note 7, at 452–53, 463–69. Although consumer 3D printers can cur-
rently produce only plastic weapons, the ability to print metal weapons already exists. See Gross, 
supra note 5. 
 11 Adan Salazar, 3D Printed Lower Receiver Withstands More Than 650 Rounds, Gun Grabbers 
Panic, INFOWARS.COM (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.infowars.com/3d-printed-lower-receiver-withstands-
more-than-650-rounds-gun-grabbers-panic, archived at http://perma.cc/JWT7-USL4; see About Defense 
Distributed, DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED, http://www.defdist.org/about/, archived at http://perma.cc/CYP9-
22KP (last visited Sept. 4, 2014) (stating that Defense Distributed is a pending nonprofit corporation, 
dedicated to “defend[ing] the human and civil right to keep and bear arms” by producing and freely dis-
tributing information enabling the 3D printing of firearms). The lower receiver is technically considered a 
“firearm,” and is the part of the weapon engraved with a serial number. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 
U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (2012) (defining “firearm” as a weapon that fires a projectile from explosive force, the 
frame or receiver of such a weapon, a muffler or silencer, or a destructive device); 27 C.F.R. 
§ 478.92(a)(1) (2014) (stating that manufacturers of firearms must place all identifying information, 
including, inter alia, the serial number, model, and caliber, on the weapon’s receiver); Deborah Camiel, 
3-D Printed AR-15s Aimed at Gun Control, CNBC.com, Apr. 22, 2013, http://www.cnbc.com/
id/100661606, archived at http://perma.cc/49ZX-HESQ (reporting that the lower receiver is typically the 
only part of a firearm engraved with a serial number). Federal regulations define the “frame or receiver” 
to include the part of the weapon containing the “hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism.” 
27 C.F.R. § 478.11(f). 
 12 See Gross, supra note 5, (stating that Solid Concepts developed a functional metal, 3D printed 
pistol); Andy Greenberg, Meet the ‘Liberator’: Test-Firing the World’s First Fully 3D-Printed Gun, 
FORBES.COM, May 5, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/05/meet-the-liberator-
test-firing-the-worlds-first-fully-3d-printed-gun/, archived at http://perma.cc/84RG-XT8L (stating that 
Defense Distributed designed a functional plastic 3D-printed pistol). 
 13 See Greenberg, supra note 12. A .380 caliber bullet is roughly equivalent to a 9 millimeter 
round. David B. Kopel, Mexico’s Gun-Control Laws: A Model for the United States?, 18 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL. 27, 35 (2013) (noting that .380 inches converts to 9.652 millimeters). The Liberator is com-
prised of sixteen 3D printed plastic parts and a small metal nail, likely undetectable by metal detectors. 
See Greenberg, supra note 12; Matthew A. Goldstein, Department of State Confirms Prior Approval 
Requirement for Electronic Exports to Public Domain in Case of 3D-Printable Gun, in 2 THOMSON 
REUTERS PRAC. TRADE & CUSTOMS STRATEGIEs 3 (June 15, 2013). 
 14 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1) (stating that it is illegal to “manufacture, import, sell, ship, deliver, 
possess, transfer, or receive” a firearm that is not detectable by a government designated metal detector); 
Mark Memmott, Gun Made with 3-D Printer Is Successfully Fired, NPR.org, May 6, 2013, http://
www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/05/06/181612663/gun-made-with-3-d-printer-is-successfully-fired, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7SHM-R8RC. The chunk of steel, however, is not essential to the weapon’s 
function. See Memmott, supra. Individual users could ostensibly print the Liberator and choose not to 
include the steel component. See id. 
1294 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1291 
The second handgun, developed by Solid Concepts, is the world’s first 
metal 3D-printed gun.15 The 3D printer required to produce the metal gun, how-
ever, is far more expensive than a consumer 3D printer that uses plastic, and re-
quires a higher degree of expertise.16 Still, as 3D printers become more accessi-
ble, the ability to print fully functional firearms with relative ease presents an 
increasing threat to existing gun regulations.17 
In May 2013, the State Department required Defense Distributed to remove 
from its website the CAD files for the Liberator and other weapon parts.18 The 
State Department ordered the CAD files removed pending a determination by 
the Directorate of Defense Controls (“DDTC”) as to whether the blueprints are 
considered technical data under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(“ITAR”).19 
This Note examines whether the ITAR proscribes posting 3D gun CAD 
files on the Internet without a license, and, if so, whether such regulations violate 
the First Amendment.20 Part I outlines the statutory and regulatory framework of 
the ITAR and the applicable First Amendment principles.21 Part II applies First 
Amendment principles to the regulatory scheme of the ITAR.22 Finally, Part III 
argues that the ITAR’s intersection with the First Amendment creates a constitu-
                                                                                                                           
 15 Gross, supra note 5 (noting that the individuals who printed the metal gun were trained engi-
neers). The gun consists of thirty-three 3D-printed metal parts, most of which are stainless steel, and can 
successfully fire at least 50 rounds. World’s First 3D Printed Metal Gun Manufactured by Solid Con-
cepts, SOLID CONCEPTS, http://www.solidconcepts.com/news-releases/worlds-first-3d-printed-metal-
gun-manufactured-solid-concepts/, archived at http://perma.cc/V674-95QY (last visited Sept. 4, 2014). 
 16 Gross, supra note 5; see also Jensen-Haxel, supra note 7, at 452 (stating that 3D printers cost 
between $150,000 and $1 million). 
 17 See Jensen-Haxel, supra note 7, at 452–53, 463–70. Furthermore, the ability to print metal ob-
jects would ostensibly allow owners of such devices to also print ammunition. See Alexis Kleinman, 3D-
Printed Bullets Exist, and They’re Terrifyingly Easy to Make, HUFFINGTON POST, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/23/3d-printed-bullets_n_3322370.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/N7T6-LQ59 (stating that CAD files for functional, albeit less effective, plastic ammunition 
exist). 
 18 See Andy Greenberg, State Department Demands Takedown of 3D-Printable Gun Files for 
Possible Export Control Violations, FORBES.COM, May 9, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/andy
greenberg/2013/05/09/state-department-demands-takedown-of-3d-printable-gun-for-possible-export-
control-violation, archived at http://perma.cc/D72W-C4R4. By the time the State Department instruct-
ed Defense Distributed to remove the Liberator CAD file from its website, approximately 100,000 people 
had already downloaded it in the preceding forty-eight hours. Id. The letter also demanded the removal 
of nine other 3D printer blueprints, including: (1) .22 electric; (2) 125mm BK-14M high-explosive 
anti-tank warhead; (3) 5.56/.223 muzzle brake; (4) Springfield XD-40 tactical slide assembly; (5) 
Sound moderator—slip on; (6) “The Dirty Diane” 1/2-28 to 3/4-16 STP S3600; (7) 12 gauge to .22 
CB sub-caliber insert; (8) Voltlock electronic black powder system; and (9) VZ-58 sight. Id. 
 19 Id. The DDTC suggested that Defense Distributed submit an application, called a “Commodity 
Jurisdiction” request, to determine whether the ITAR regulates the export of 3D CAD files. Id. Com-
modity Jurisdiction is the procedure utilized by the DDTC to determine whether the ITAR governs the 
export of a particular item. 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(a) (2014). 
 20 See infra notes 24–257 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 24–92 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 93–165 and accompanying text. 
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tional catch-22 insofar as courts have declined to determine the ITAR’s constitu-
tionality, but without judicial review, the ITAR is an unconstitutional prior re-
straint on speech.23 
I. THE ITAR AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
This Part explores the pertinent components of the intersection between the 
ITAR and the First Amendment.24 Section A illustrates the relevant substance 
and procedures of the ITAR.25 Section B then explores the applicable First 
Amendment principles articulated by the Supreme Court.26 
A. The Prohibitions, Exceptions, and Procedures of the ITAR 
Through the Arms Export and Control Act (AECA), the DDTC has the au-
thority to regulate the export of “defense articles and defense services.”27 The 
AECA states that the purpose of the regulations is to advance world peace and 
the national security and foreign policy of the United States.28 
The United States Munitions List (“USML”) is an extensive list of regulat-
ed defense articles, defense services, and technical data, organized into twenty-
one categories.29 The DDTC may designate an article as a defense article if it 
meets the criteria of the USML or has functionally equivalent capabilities.30 Cat-
egory I of the USML includes all firearms up to .50 caliber designed to fire a 
projectile resulting from explosive force, and all technical data directly related to 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See infra notes 166–257 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 27–92 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 27–46 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 47–92 and accompanying text. 
 27 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2012); 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2014). The AECA explicitly grants regu-
latory power to the President. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). The President delegated that authority to the 
Secretary of State, who in turn delegated it to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense 
Trade Controls, who oversees the DDTC. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a). The DDTC implements its authority 
through the ITAR, which includes the United States Munitions List (“USML”), comprised of the items 
the DDTC designates as defense articles. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1); 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1(a), 121.1(a). 
Defense article refers to any “item or technical data” contained in the USML. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.6. 
 28 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (“In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of 
the United States, the President is authorized to control the import and the export of defense articles 
and defense services . . . .”). 
 29 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(I)–(XXI) (2014). The categories cover a broad range of items, including 
firearms, above and below .50 caliber (categories I and II); missiles, rocks, torpedoes, bombs, and 
mines, (category IV); tanks and other “armored combat ground vehicles” (category VI); certain chem-
ical compounds and related equipment (category XIV); spacecraft and related articles (category XV); 
and “directed energy weapons” such as lasers and particle beam systems (category XVIII). § 121.1(I)–
(II), (IV), (VI), (XIV)–(XV), (XVIII). 
 30 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.3. The initial designation of an item on the USML is based on whether the 
article is designed for military application, has civil applications, or has significant military or intelli-
gence capability. Id. 
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such firearms.31 Technical data includes, among other things, information neces-
sary for the design and manufacture of defense articles.32 
If it is unclear whether the USML covers a particular article, an interested 
party may submit a Commodity Jurisdiction determination request to the 
DDTC.33 The DDTC makes these determinations on a case-by-case basis, evalu-
ating whether the article is already covered by the USML, is functionally equiva-
lent to an article on the USML, or has substantial military or intelligence appli-
cations.34 An interested party cannot challenge the DDTC’s determination that 
an article qualifies as a defense article on the USML because the AECA explicit-
ly precludes judicial review of USML designations.35 Nevertheless, the statute 
does not explicitly preclude constitutional challenges to USML designations.36 
Additionally, the ITAR prohibits the export of any defense article, including 
technical data, without a license.37 The definition of export includes transmitting 
a defense article outside of the United States in any form.38 One can also export 
                                                                                                                           
 31 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(I)(a), (i). The Liberator Pistol and the 3D printable lower receiver for the 
AR-15, both designed by Defense Distributed, would fall under Category I. See id.; see also Spring-
field Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 252 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the AR-15 fires 
.223 caliber bullets); see Greenberg, supra note 12 (stating that the Liberator Pistol fires .380 caliber 
bullets). 
 32 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1) (defining technical data as information necessary to “the design, de-
velopment, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification 
of defense articles”); § 121.1(i) (stating that “[t]echnical data (as defined in § 120.10 of this subchap-
ter) . . . directly related to defense articles enumerated in [Category I)” is itself included in Category 
I). 
 33 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(a). 
 34 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(d)(1)–(2). The DDTC considers the same criteria in designating defense 
articles whether the determination is made by the DDTC independently or based on an interested 
party’s submission of a Commodity Jurisdiction request. See § 120.3; § 120.4(d)(1)–(3). 
 35 The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h) (2012) (“The designation by 
the President (or by an official to whom the President’s functions . . . have been duly delegated), in 
regulations issued under this section, of items as defense articles or defense services for purposes of 
this section shall not be subject to judicial review.”). 
 36 See id.; Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 1996). In Karn v. United 
States Department of State, the government conceded that the AECA does not preclude constitutional 
challenges. See 925 F. Supp. at 9. Whether Congress can, in fact, prevent judicial review of constitu-
tional questions is a controversial issue regarding federal jurisdiction. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 
592, 603 (1988) (holding that the Court would not infer a prohibition on judicial review of constitu-
tional questions, because Congress’s ability to do so presents a complex constitutional issue). Accord-
ingly, a party could not challenge a designation by asserting that, for example, technical data for a .50 
caliber handgun lacks significant military or intelligence applications. See 22 U.S.C. § 778(h); 22 
C.F.R. § 120.3 (2014); § 120.4(d). In theory, however, a party could challenge a designation by assert-
ing the designation violates his or her constitutional rights. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 9. 
 37 22 C.F.R. § 120.6 (defining “defense article” as including technical data); § 120.10 (defining 
“technical data” as information required for the manufacture of a defense article); § 127.1(a)(1) (stat-
ing that it is unlawful to export a defense article without a license); see also § 121.1(I)(i) (defining 
technical data as it applies to firearms up to .50 caliber under Category I). 
 38 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1). The regulations provide an exception for a person traveling outside 
of the United States who happens to have personal knowledge of technical data. Id. 
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under the ITAR by orally or visually disclosing or transferring a defense article 
to a foreign entity in the United States (such as an embassy), or to a foreign per-
son, whether in the United States or abroad.39 The ITAR’s export restrictions are 
violated when an individual or company willfully exports, or attempts to export, 
an article contained in the USML without a license.40 
Notably, technical data does not include information already in the public 
domain.41 As defined in the ITAR, “public domain” includes published infor-
mation generally available or accessible to the public in a variety of ways, in-
cluding newsstands and bookstores, public libraries, and some research at ac-
credited universities.42 The public domain exception does not automatically in-
clude information available on the Internet.43 Furthermore, one cannot attempt to 
transmit technical data in the public domain if doing so violates the ITAR.44 
If the DDTC determines that a CAD file for a 3D firearm is technical data, 
the file’s distributor would need a license to make the file accessible on the In-
ternet.45 If the DDTC further determines that posting the file online is an unau-
thorized export, the distributors could be subject to huge fines and long-term 
imprisonment.46 
B. First Amendment Principles: Regulating for Content and Prior Restraints 
The freedom of speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment, protects vari-
ous forms of expression.47 The Supreme Court has espoused several theories of 
First Amendment protections.48 In particular, two types of restrictions on speech 
                                                                                                                           
 39 § 120.17(a)(3)–(4); see also § 120.16 (defining a foreign person as any individual who is not a 
lawful permanent resident). 
 40 United States v. Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 41 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5). Accordingly, the export controls do not apply to information in the 
public domain. § 125.1(a). 
 42 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a) (2014). 
 43 See id.; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 5. Nothing in the regulation indicates that information 
otherwise in the public domain loses its status by virtue of its presence on the Internet. See 22 C.F.R. 
§ 120.11. The government, however, bears the burden to prove that the information is not in the public 
domain. See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1132, 1137 (stating that the trial court correctly instructed the jury 
that the government must prove articles to not be in the public domain). 
 44 See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that the DDTC does not consider the public domain 
exception applicable to technical data placed into the public domain without authorization). 
 45 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.1(a), 125.1, 125.2, 127.1(a)(1). 
 46 See The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2012) (stating that for each violation, 
an unlicensed exporter could be subject to one million dollars in fines and/or 20 years in prison for 
each violation); 22 C.F.R. § 127.3. 
 47 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech 
. . . .”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (holding that the First Amendment protects not 
only speech, but also expressive conduct such as wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, 
sit-ins to protest segregation, and burning the American flag as part of a political demonstration). 
 48 See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (holding that the primary purpose 
of the First Amendment is to prevent content-based censorship); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 273–74 (1964) (indicating that the “central meaning” of the First Amendment is to protect politi-
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are uniformly recognized as the most likely to violate the First Amendment: con-
tent-based restrictions and prior restraints.49 The protections afforded against 
even these most egregious restrictions, however, are neither absolute nor uni-
form.50 Subsection 1 explores the Court’s treatment of content-neutral and con-
tent-based restrictions on speech.51 Subsection 2 then discusses the prior restraint 
doctrine as it applies to licensing schemes that restrict speech.52 
1. Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Restrictions 
The Supreme Court distinguishes between restrictions of expression that 
are content-based and content-neutral.53 Content-based restrictions are strongly 
disfavored, due to the risk of censorship.54 A government regulation is content-
based if it targets speech due to either the point of view of the speaker or the sub-
ject matter of the speech.55 For example, a law prohibiting anti-government 
speech is content-based because it directly targets a particular viewpoint.56 Addi-
                                                                                                                           
cal speech); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (stating that the “chief pur-
pose” of the First Amendment is to prevent prior restraints upon publication). 
 49 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 116, 123 (1991) (holding that a law targeting publishers and requiring donations of profits based 
on the subject of a book violated the First Amendment as a content-based restriction on speech); Near, 
283 U.S. at 713 (stating that a primary objective of the First Amendment is to prevent prior restraints 
on speech). 
 50 Compare Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (holding that flag burning as a form of political speech is a 
protected expression under the First Amendment), with United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 
382 (1968) (holding that burning a draft card as a form of symbolic speech was not constitutionally 
protected speech). 
 51 See infra notes 53–74 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 75–92 and accompanying text. 
 53 See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116, 123 (finding a law requiring publishers to forfeit prof-
its based on the topic of a book to be an unconstitutional, content-based restriction); Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that the government may restrict speech in certain 
circumstances when the restriction is made without reference to content). 
 54 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (noting that content-based prohibitions, par-
ticularly those backed by significant criminal penalties, must be presumed invalid based on their re-
pressive effect on “the lives and thoughts of a free people”); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95–96; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral 
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 54–57 (1987) (stating that courts strictly scrutinize content-based 
restrictions because they potentially enable the government to distort public debate, regulate speech 
based on improper motivations, and more substantially limit the protected and communicative aspects 
of expression). 
 55 See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 (holding that a law suppressing an individual’s expression 
of dissatisfaction with the government is a content-based restriction); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
215–20 (1966) (deciding that a law prohibiting a newspaper editor from encouraging voters to vote a 
certain way was a content-based violation of the First Amendment); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 962–63 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that a law is content neu-
tral only if it is both “viewpoint neutral” and “subject matter neutral”). 
 56 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 (holding that a law preventing an individual from expressing 
dissatisfaction with the government was an unconstitutional content-based restriction); Stone, supra 
note 54, at 47 (stating that the prohibition of libel, banning the publication of confidential information, 
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tionally, a law requiring Internet users to identify themselves prior to accessing 
pornographic materials online is content-based because it regulates speech prem-
ised on subject matter.57 Conversely, a law is content neutral when the restriction 
targets neither the point of view nor the subject matter.58 
Content-based restrictions are generally subject to strict scrutiny because 
they present the greatest risk of government actively suppressing ideas.59 Not all 
content, however, is created equal.60 Courts engage, to some extent, in a deter-
mination of the speech’s value.61 When evaluating content-based restrictions, the 
Supreme Court first analyzes where the speech falls on a spectrum of First 
Amendment values.62 If the restriction applies to low-value speech, the Court 
                                                                                                                           
forbidding the hiring of individuals with particular political views, and outlawing the display of swas-
tikas are all examples of content-based restrictions). 
 57 Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 661–62, 670 (holding that a law requiring individuals to identify them-
selves when accessing pornographic material on the Internet was an unconstitutional content-based 
restriction); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion) (stating that 
restrictions based on the certain topics of speech are content-based restrictions). For example, a law 
prohibiting all picketing in residential areas, except for labor pickets connected to a place of employ-
ment, is an unconstitutional content-based restriction because it makes an exception for labor pickets. 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460–61 (1980). 
 58 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (holding that a law requiring 
local cable companies to carry local stations was content neutral because the law required carriers to 
offer all local stations). 
 59 See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660 (noting that content-based restrictions present the greatest threat 
to free speech); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95–98 (noting the distinct danger in permitting the government to 
select certain viewpoints to suppress); Stone, supra note 54, at 47–48. 
 60 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (holding that there is a 
“common sense” distinction between commercial speech and other forms of expression); Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting that some speech is so low value that it does 
not warrant First Amendment protection); Stone, supra note 54, at 47. 
 61 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56 (holding that commercial speech is not entitled to the highest 
level of First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (acknowledging that some 
speech does not warrant First Amendment protection). 
 62 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56; Andrea L. Crowley, Note, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: How 
the Supreme Court Missed the Writing on the Wall, 34 B.C. L. REV. 771, 778 (1993) (noting that cer-
tain types of speech, such as child pornography and fighting words, are not entitled to First Amend-
ment protections). In 1978, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, the Supreme Court held that commer-
cial speech occupied a low-priority position “in the scale of First Amendment values.” 436 U.S. at 
456. Other types of speech low on the spectrum of First Amendment values include incitement, ob-
scenity, and false statements of facts. Stone, supra note 54, at 47 n.3. By contrast, political expression 
and publication by the press are among those with the highest value. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 
(holding that expressing dissatisfaction with the government is the “core” of First Amendment protec-
tion); Near, 283 U.S. at 713–14 (stating that freedom of the press is essential to a free state). Further-
more, restrictions on speech that implicate additional substantive rights occupy a high position on the 
spectrum of First Amendment values. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. 
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 161 (2002) (holding that licensing requirements for door-to-door canvassing 
was unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah’s witnesses because it limited expression connected to the 
free exercise of religion); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (stating that neutral, 
generally applicable laws violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause when they implicate 
other constitutional rights, including free expression); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–30 
(1963) (holding that an anti-solicitation rule restricting the NAACP’s ability to find plaintiffs for civil 
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applies a lower level of scrutiny and determines whether the circumstances justi-
fy the law’s suppressive effect on expression.63 If the restricted speech occupies 
a higher position on the value spectrum, the Court applies strict scrutiny.64 Ac-
cordingly, content-based restrictions on high-value speech are subject to even 
greater scrutiny than content-based restrictions on lower value speech.65 
When the purpose of a content-based restriction is not to target the speech 
itself, but rather to limit undesirable “secondary effects” associated with the 
speech, the Court treats content-based restrictions as though they are content 
neutral.66 For example, in 1986, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the 
Supreme Court upheld a rule prohibiting adult movie theaters near residential 
zones.67 Though the rule applied exclusively to theatres showing sexually explic-
it films, the Court distinguished the rule from a typical content-based restriction 
because the rule’s purpose was to eliminate ancillary criminal activity associated 
with these establishments.68 Accordingly, the Court stated the rule did not target 
the speech, but rather sought to suppress criminal activity commonly associated 
                                                                                                                           
rights actions was unconstitutional because it foreclosed expression necessary to secure equal protec-
tion under the law). 
 63 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (stating that commercial speech receives only limited First 
Amendment protections because it is of low value); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) 
(stating that the First Amendment does not protect obscene expression, which lacks any “literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value”). 
 64 Stone, supra note 54, at 48. The Court has struck down nearly every content-based regulation 
of speech other than those deemed low value. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713, 714–15 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (holding that a restriction on free speech based solely on 
national security concerns is not itself substantial justification); id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(holding that national security may justify restrictions on speech during times of war). These opinions 
demonstrate that freedom of the press, at least as it pertains to disclosure regarding the operation of 
the government, is high-value speech. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714–15 (Black, J., concurring); 
id. at 713 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amend-
ment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 606 (stating that protecting political speech is a central function of the 
First Amendment). 
 65 Compare Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 (finding that a content-based restriction on political expres-
sion was subject to the strictest scrutiny), with Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48 (holding that a restriction 
affecting only sexually explicit expression was subject to treatment as a content-neutral regulation); 
see also Stone, supra note 54, at 47–48. 
 66 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–49 (holding that a law restricting only sexually explicit speech was 
constitutional because the purpose of the law was to eliminate crime commonly associated with insti-
tutions facilitating that speech); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 965 (stating that the Supreme Court 
treats facially content-based restrictions as though they are content-neutral if the restriction’s purpose 
is to address otherwise regulable secondary effects). 
 67 See 475 U.S. at 47–49, 54 (holding that the rule was constitutional because the government 
interest was substantial and the rule restricted only the time, place, and manner of the expression). 
 68 See id. at 47; see also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52–55 (1976) (plurality 
opinion) (holding that a law restricting the location of adult theatres was constitutional because it 
sought to limit the accumulation of vagrants, increased crime and prostitution, and declining property 
values). 
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with adult theatres.69 This secondary effects test allows the Court to apply inter-
mediate rather than strict scrutiny to some content-based restrictions.70 
The constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions depends on the balanc-
ing of several factors.71 When the restriction is narrowly tailored and leaves open 
other avenues for expression, courts are more likely to uphold the restriction.72 
Similarly, courts tend to uphold restrictions that further substantial government 
interests when the regulatory authority otherwise falls within the government’s 
constitutional power.73 The Supreme Court applies varying levels of scrutiny 
depending on the balance of the interests.74 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. But see id. at 56–57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that 
secondary effects speak only to the strength of the government interest, but do not convert an explicit-
ly content-based rule into a content-neutral one); Chase J. Sanders, Bearing the First Amendment’s 
Crosses: An Analysis of State v. Sheldon, 53 MD. L. REV. 494, 509–10 (1994) (arguing that the sec-
ondary effects test allows the government to make an “end run” around First Amendment protections 
by justifying the regulation on the unrelated, secondary effect of the speech). 
 70 See Stone, supra note 54, at 48–54. In Renton, however, it is not clear that, even if the Court 
had treated the rule as content-based, the Court would have struck the restriction down. See 475 U.S. 
at 47–48; supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (stating that content-based restrictions on low-
value speech are not necessarily strictly scrutinized). Some commentators argue that sexually explicit 
speech is low value, and therefore unlikely to warrant true strict scrutiny. See Sunstein, supra note 64, 
at 606–07. The Court has not invoked the secondary effects doctrine when evaluating restrictions on 
high-value speech. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding that the secondary effects 
doctrine did not apply in a case concerning a restriction on political speech). 
 71 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77 (stating that a content-neutral restriction is justified “if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if 
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest”). These factors comprise the analysis known as the “O’Brien test.” See 
Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10. 
 72 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 381 (stating that a law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards 
was sufficiently narrow and did not preclude meaningful opportunities for expressing dissatisfaction 
with the government); Renton, 475 U.S. at 50–52 (explaining that a constitutional restriction did not 
prohibit adult theaters outright, but left open other avenues for expression). O’Brien did not explicitly 
state that the speech’s value was relevant to the determination, but instead focused on the strength of 
the government interest. 391 U.S at 376–77. Nevertheless, the value of the content may still be rele-
vant. Compare Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 161 (noting that an ordinance prohibiting handbilling, with-
out respect to content, was high-value speech because it infringed on a traditional method of religious 
expression), and Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408 (holding that restricting a particular form of political ex-
pression was unconstitutional even though the law was premised as a way to keep the peace), with 
Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (holding that limited restrictions on businesses engaged in sexually explicit 
speech did not violate the First Amendment). 
 73 Compare O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (holding that a content-neutral restriction was constitutional 
because it fell within the government’s authority and the restriction advanced significant government 
interests), with Johnson, 419 U.S. at 408 (holding that the government interest in prosecuting flag 
burning due to the potential breach of the peace was insufficient to restrict political speech). 
 74 See Stone, supra note 54, at 48–54, 57–59 (arguing that the degree of scrutiny applied to con-
tent-neutral restrictions depends primarily on the extent to which the law leaves open other means for 
expression). More exacting scrutiny generally corresponds with a deeper analysis of the government 
interest and the necessity of the law in furthering that interest. See id. at 50–54; see also Renton, 475 
U.S. at 50–52 (holding that a law was constitutional when the restriction on speech limited only the 
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2. The Prior Restraint Doctrine 
Of the various free speech protections afforded by the First Amendment, 
perhaps the most significant is the prevention of prior restraints.75 Accordingly, 
prior restraints begin with a strong presumption against their validity.76 The gov-
ernment, therefore, faces a heavy burden to prove that the prior restraint is con-
stitutionally tolerable.77 Prior restraints occur when a law, regulatory scheme, or 
court order prevents expression in the first instance.78 Generally, to survive con-
stitutional scrutiny, licensing schemes that function as a prior restraint on speech 
must have (1) an important reason for licensing, (2) clear standards that virtually 
eliminate government discretion, and (3) certain procedural safeguards to miti-
gate the danger of censorship.79 
First, evaluating the significance of a licensing scheme’s purpose is analyti-
cally similar to examining the government’s interest with respect to content-
neutral or content-based restrictions on speech.80 The more compelling the gov-
ernment’s purpose, the more likely the scheme will survive First Amendment 
scrutiny.81 Still, the regulatory scheme must be as narrowly tailored as possible, 
                                                                                                                           
time, place, and manner of expression and served a “substantial” government interest); Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607–11 (1982) (holding that a statute barring the press 
from a criminal trial violated the First Amendment because it was not “necessary” to further a “com-
pelling government interest”). 
 75 See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“[P]rior restraints on speech and 
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”); 
Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (noting that the chief purpose of the First Amendment is to prevent prior re-
straints). 
 76 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (holding that prior restraints face a 
“heavy presumption” of invalidity); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (N.D. 
Cal. 1996) (noting that prior restraints are presumptively invalid). 
 77 See Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419 (holding that a party seeking to enjoin speech must meet a heavy 
burden to justify the use of a court order to restrict speech). 
 78 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
55, at 978–82 (arguing that the Supreme Court has gone out of its way in certain cases to avoid find-
ing prior restraints, due to the heavy presumption of invalidity). For example, in 1994, in Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Center, the Court held that an injunction restricting speech around an abortion clinic 
was not a prior restraint. 512 U.S. 753, 763 n.2 (1994). One scholar has argued that such an injunction 
is a prototypical prior restraint, but the court declined to treat the restriction as a prior restraint due to 
the sensitive subject matter. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 981. 
 79 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988); Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965); Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1287. 
 80 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574–76 (1941); supra notes 66–74 and accompany-
ing text (explaining how the significance of the government interest in considering the validity of 
content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech). 
 81 See Cox, 312 U.S. at 575–76. For example, in Cox v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court held 
that the local government interests in proper policing, efficiency of scheduling, and public conven-
ience justified implementing a licensing scheme for parades and public demonstrations. Id. In contrast, 
the Court struck down an ordinance that required all door-to-door canvassers, promoting a cause, to 
first obtain a license from the mayor. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 154, 168–69. The Court held that even 
legitimate interests, such as crime prevention and limiting solicitation, were not significant enough to 
overcome the breadth of the infringement on speech. Id. at 165, 167–68. 
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so it does not restrict speech more than necessary to adequately serve the gov-
ernment interest.82 
Second, valid licensing schemes must remove virtually all discretion from 
the licensing authority to eliminate the risk of content-based restrictions.83 Li-
censing regimes cannot constitutionally regulate speech based on the whim of a 
government official who may decide to grant or deny a license with no guiding 
criteria.84 Without explicit limitations on licensing authority, an official can cen-
sor speech based on biases and ulterior motives.85 Therefore, prevent licensing 
officials from engaging in censorship requires clearly delineated standards.86 
Finally, in light of the unique dangers of prior restraints in licensing 
schemes, in 1965, in Freedman v. Maryland, the Supreme Court established 
three generally applicable procedural safeguards.87 In order to be valid, a licens-
ing scheme must (1) require the licensing official to grant the license or go to 
court to enjoin the expression within a fixed period of time, (2) provide for ex-
peditious judicial review, and (3) place the burden of proof on the government to 
demonstrate that the speech is not protected.88 
In two recent cases, however, the Supreme Court relaxed this final re-
quirement.89 When the speech at issue is considered to be low value and other 
avenues of expression remain open, the harm caused by the restraint is less sig-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 168–69; Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–99. 
 83 See Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757 (stating that a licensing scheme conferring broad discretion on 
licensing officials is subject to facial attack, even without actual proof of abuse); Freedman, 380 U.S. 
at 57–58 (holding that prior restraints are particularly dangerous because they give government offi-
cials the power to determine permissible forms of speech outside of the judicial process). For exam-
ple, in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., the Supreme Court struck down a licensing 
scheme because it gave the mayor unfettered discretion in granting the licenses required to place 
newspaper kiosks on public property. 486 U.S. at 770. The Court also held that requiring the mayor to 
state the grounds of denial was, by itself, insufficient to limit the mayor’s discretion. See id. But see 
id. at 793 n.13 (White, J., dissenting) (maintaining that requiring the mayor to state the reasons for 
denying a license reduced the potential for censorship). 
 84 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969); Bernstein, 945 F. 
Supp. at 1289. 
 85 See Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757; Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 
 86 See Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757; Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150–51; Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 
1289. 
 87 380 U.S. at 58–59. 
 88 Id.; see also Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1286–90 (applying the prior restraint analysis to the 
ITAR). 
 89 See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 780–81 (2004); FW/PBS, Inc. v. 
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228–30 (1990) (plurality opinion). Because both cases dealt with the 
free speech rights of businesses partaking in sexually explicit speech, the procedural requirements 
may be loosened only with respect to low-value speech. See Littleton, 541 U.S. at 780–81 (holding 
that the plurality opinion of the court in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas makes clear that only the core 
policy of Freedman applies to adult business licensing schemes); see also Sunstein, supra note 64, at 
606–07 (arguing that sexually explicit speech is low value). 
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nificant.90 Furthermore, the Court has held that the burden of proof does not 
need to favor speech if the licensing decision is based on a ministerial assess-
ment of the potential licensee’s qualifications.91 When the licensing official 
makes the decision based on objective criteria, the danger of censorship is sub-
stantially reduced.92 
II. FIREARM CAD FILES, THE ITAR, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The intersection of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) 
and First Amendment principles presents difficult questions, given the signifi-
cance of the individual’s free expression and the government’s interest in effec-
tive firearm regulation.93 Only a few courts have examined the intersection of 
First Amendment principles and the ITAR’s licensing scheme.94 Generally, 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000) (holding that a statute limiting speech 
around health care facilities left open ample channels of communication because protestors outside of 
the buffer zone could meaningfully communicate orally at reasonable volumes and visually by using 
signs); Ward, 491 U.S. at 784, 802 (upholding a restriction limiting the volume of public performanc-
es because the volume levels below the statutory limit constituted an adequate means of communica-
tion); Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (upholding a restriction that left 520 acres available to host adult busi-
ness). 
 91 FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229 (plurality opinion). It is unclear whether the “ministerial” analysis is 
distinguishable from the requirement that the scheme remove discretion from the licensing official. 
See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 92 Littleton, 541 U.S. at 783. If the decision must be made on objective criteria, sufficient limiting 
principles exist to prevent ulterior motives from guiding the licensor’s decision. See id.; Bernstein, 
945 F. Supp. at 1289. The Supreme Court thus evaluates the objectivity of the licensing standards at 
two points: first, whether the licensing scheme confers such broad discretion that the regulation is 
unconstitutional, and second, whether the criteria are “ministerial” to determine whether the govern-
ment bears the burden of proof. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229; Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757, 770. The 
Court did not indicate if the standards differ, but instead invoked similar reasoning regarding the risk 
of censorship and arbitrariness. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229; Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757, 770. 
 93 Compare United States v. Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
ITAR is constitutional because, among other things, the regulations serve an important government 
interest), with Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding 
that the government interest in national security alone is insufficient to justify the ITAR, which im-
poses a content-based prior restraint on speech). 
 94 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–36; United States v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487, 1496–97 (9th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 519–22 (9th Cir. 1978); Bernstein, 945 F. 
Supp. at 1286–95; Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 8–13 (D.D.C. 1996). In 1978, in Unit-
ed States v. Edler Industries, Inc., the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit evaluated the 
United States Munitions List (“USML”) as it existed under the Mutual Security Act, the Arms Export 
and Control Act’s (“AECA”) predecessor, and the Ninth Circuit has since explicitly adopted the same 
reasoning in recent cases involving the ITAR. See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1135–36; Edler, 579 F.2d at 
519. In addition, in 1998, in Junger v. Daley, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio eval-
uated a First Amendment challenge to the Export Administration Regulations, a regulatory scheme 
that closely resembles the ITAR. 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 720 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 
209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that the Export Administration Regulations prohibit the export of 
certain software outside the United States without a license); see The Export Administration Regula-
tions, 22 C.F.R. §§ 730–780 (2014); supra notes 27–46 and accompanying text (describing the regula-
tory framework of the ITAR). 
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courts have concluded that the ITAR constitutes a content-neutral restriction on 
speech.95 These courts have also upheld the ITAR in the face of First Amend-
ment challenges.96 
Notably though, the cases present factual circumstances that make them 
poor analogs to firearm CAD files.97 Significantly, none of the courts explicitly 
examined the value of the speech at issue.98 Courts that upheld the ITAR also did 
not evaluate the sufficiency of the ITAR’s procedural protections as a regulatory 
scheme that restricts free speech.99 Only one court ruled on the sufficiency of the 
ITAR’s procedural safeguards against censorship, and it concluded that the ITAR 
lacked the requisite protections.100 Still other courts avoided ruling on the Arms 
Export and Control Act’s (“AECA”) explicit preclusion of judicial review for 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See Chi Mak, 638 F.3d at 1134–36; Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10–11. By contrast, in 1996, in Bern-
stein v. U.S. Department of State, the District Court for the Northern District of California appears to 
be the only court concluding that the ITAR is an unconstitutional, content-based, prior restraint on 
speech. See 945 F. Supp. at 1289–90. Although the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
effectively overruled the district court’s conclusion in 2012, in United States v. Chi Mak, Bernstein is 
the only case to analyze the procedural requirements for a constitutional licensing regime with respect 
to free speech in-depth. See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–36; Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1290. 
 96 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–36 (holding that the ITAR did not violate the First Amend-
ment); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10–12 (same). 
 97 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1131, 1134–36 (finding that the ITAR did not violate the First 
Amendment by prohibiting the accused from exporting data regarding electrical systems about naval 
ships and submarines); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 3, 10–12 (finding that the ITAR constitutionally regu-
lates the proliferation of cryptographic software). But see Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1290 (finding that 
the ITAR unconstitutionally prohibits the disclosure of cryptography software). Chi Mak is a poor 
analog to 3D CAD files given the extreme nature of the violation in that case, as the information at 
issue was classified and related to major national security interests. See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1131. 
Additionally, in Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State and Bernstein, the courts evaluated non-military encryp-
tion software, which the ITAR subsequently removed from its scope. See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 
1290; Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10; Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C95-0582 MHP, 2004 WL 
838163, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004) (noting that the Export Administration Regulations, under 
the Commerce Department’s jurisdiction, now regulates non-military encryption software instead of 
the ITAR). Nevertheless, the two regulatory frameworks still share some similarity. See supra note 94 
and accompanying text (stating that the Export Administration Regulations are closely related to the 
ITAR). 
 98 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–36; Posey, 864 F.2d at 1496–97; Edler, 579 F.2d at 519–22; 
Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1286–92; Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10–12. 
 99 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–37; Posey, 864 F.2d at 1496–97; Edler, 579 F.2d at 519–22; 
Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10-12; see also supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (discussing the pro-
cedural safeguards necessary for a licensing scheme that restricts speech to be valid). 
 100 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289–90. The court found that the ITAR grants licensing officials 
unfettered discretion, in an unlimited time frame, and unconstitutionally precludes judicial review of 
USML designations. See id. at 1289–90. The court also held that, because the ITAR is content-based, 
the government must still bear the burden to prove the speech is not protected. See id. at 1290; supra 
notes 87–92 and accompanying text (discussing the procedures required for a licensing scheme that 
restricts speech to survive constitutional scrutiny). But cf. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 8–9 (holding that the 
AECA’s preclusion of judicial review does not extend to constitutional challenges). 
1306 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1291 
United States Munitions List (“USML”) designations by invoking the political 
questions doctrine.101 
This Part analyzes the First Amendment consequences of the ITAR’s regu-
lation of technical data as it pertains to 3D firearm CAD files.102 Section A dis-
cusses how courts treat the ITAR as being either a content-neutral or content-
based restriction.103 Section B applies the principles governing prior restraints on 
speech to the ITAR’s licensing regime.104 
A. Should the ITAR Be Scrutinized as a Content-Based or  
Content-Neutral Restriction? 
The majority of courts analyzing the ITAR’s effect on speech have con-
cluded that its limitations are content-neutral.105 For example, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the ITAR is content-neutral be-
cause it regulates speech based on its “function,” and not on a point of view.106 
By contrast, in 1996, in Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State, the District Court 
for the Northern District of California indicated that the ITAR is a content-based 
restriction because it regulates speech based on the substance of the data.107 
Under First Amendment precedent, a rule that restricts speech based on 
subject matter is content-based, even if it does not directly suppress a point of 
view.108 The ITAR potentially restricts speech at two points: first, through the 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the validity of 
regulation based on the article’s potential effect on the military capabilities of foreign countries is a 
political question); United States v. Martinez, 904 F.2d 601, 602 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the act 
of designating an article on the USML is itself a political question). The political question doctrine 
allows courts to defer to the political branches when the Constitution explicitly grants power to the 
other branches of government and is commonly invoked in areas such as foreign affairs and national 
security. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (plurality opinion) (stating that political ques-
tions are issues that are more appropriately decided by one of the political branches of government 
and lack criteria for satisfactory judicial determination); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432–
33 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that matters of national security and foreign policy are non-justiciable 
political questions). 
 102 See infra notes 105–165 and accompanying text. 
 103 See infra notes 105–115 and accompanying text. 
 104 See infra notes 116–165 and accompanying text. 
 105 Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134; Karn 925 F. Supp. at 10; see also Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 720 
(holding that the Export Administration Regulations are content-neutral because they regulated en-
cryption software without regard to the views it expressed). 
 106 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–35; see also Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10–11 (stating that the 
ITAR is content-neutral because its purpose is to advance foreign policy and national security goals). 
 107 See 945 F. Supp. at 1290 (stating that, by specifically targeting cryptographic software, the 
ITAR is a content-based restriction). The court’s decision, however, related specifically to Category 
XIII(b) of the USML, which covers, inter alia, cryptographic software. Id. at 1288; 22 C.F.R. 
§ 121.1(XIII)(b) (2014). 
 108 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661, 665 (2004) (holding that a law regulating a particu-
lar subject, without reference to a point of view, was content-based); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 
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initial designation of the article on the USML, and second, through the licensing 
decision.109 Once the DDTC decides that a particular item falls within the scope 
of the USML, one may only export the item if it is licensed under the ITAR.110 
In addition to the initial designation of the article on the USML, a licensing deci-
sion itself has the potential to be content-based.111 
Even if the ITAR is content-based, it may nevertheless avoid strict scrutiny 
under the doctrine of secondary effects.112 For example, in Bernstein, the court 
acknowledged that the purpose of the ITAR could be content-neutral.113 Addi-
tionally, in 1996, in United States v. Karn, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia took special note of the purpose for the regulation in finding the regu-
lations content neutral.114 When a restriction intends not to impair the freedom of 
                                                                                                                           
191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that restrictions based on the topic of speech are content-
based restrictions); see also supra notes 53–65 and accompanying text. 
 109 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(a) (describing the Commodity Jurisdiction procedure, by which the 
Directorate of Defense Controls (“DDTC”) determines whether an article meets the specifications of a 
defense article designated on the USML); § 126.7(a) (stating the grounds upon which the DDTC may 
deny licenses to those seeking to export defense articles); see also Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289–90 
(holding that the ITAR is an unconstitutional restriction on free expression). 
 110 22 C.F.R. §§ 125.1, 125.2(a). Through the Commodity Jurisdiction process the DDTC deter-
mines whether the substance of a file meets the specifications of a defense article contained in the 
USML, or whether the article has significant military or intelligence applications. § 120.4(d)(2)–(3). 
 111 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1287 (noting that licensing systems that confer broad discretion 
on officials create the opportunity for content-based restrictions on speech); 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a) 
(stating the grounds for denying applications for export licenses under the ITAR). For example, the 
DDTC may deny a license when it determines the denial furthers the policy objectives of the AECA. See 
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2012) (stating that the purpose of the 
AECA is to further world peace, national security, and foreign policy goals of the United States); 22 
C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (stating that the DDTC may deny a license if doing so furthers national security, 
foreign policy, or world peace). To make this determination, the DDTC evaluates the nature of the tech-
nical data to assess its impact on the AECA’s policy goals. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (stating that the 
AECA grants the Executive Branch the authority to regulate the exportation of defense articles to 
advance national security, foreign policy, and world peace); 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (stating that the 
DDTC may deny a license to further the AECA’s policy goals); see also 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(d)(2)–(3) 
(stating that the DDTC makes determinations that an article qualifies as a USML designated defense 
article on a case-by-case basis). Notably, an applicant’s criminal history, eligibility to contract with the 
United States, and application accuracy do not implicate the AECA’s policy objectives. See 22 C.F.R. 
§ 126.7(a)(2)–(8); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a). 
 112 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); supra notes 66–70 and 
accompanying text. But see Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 n.7 (declining to apply secondary effects 
analysis to the ITAR). 
 113 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288. The court did not ultimately determine whether the ITAR’s 
purpose is, in fact, neutral. Id. at 1288–89. Rather, the court stated that the content-neutral nature of 
encryption software made neutrality of any applicable restrictions unclear. Id. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that even if it treated the ITAR as a content-neutral restriction, it still is an unconstitutional 
prior restraint. Id. at 1289. 
 114 See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10; see also 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (granting the Executive Branch the 
power to regulate for the purpose of furthering world peace, national security, and foreign policy). 
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speech, but to address undesirable consequences commonly associated with the 
speech, courts generally apply intermediate or low scrutiny.115 
B. The Constitutionality of the ITAR as a Prior Restraint 
The only court to apply the prior restraint doctrine to the ITAR’s re-
strictions on speech concluded the licensing scheme violated the First Amend-
ment.116 The court held that the ITAR operates as a prior restraint because the 
Directorate of Defense Controls (“DDTC”) prohibits expression without a li-
cense, albeit in limited circumstances.117 This Section applies the prior restraint 
doctrine to the ITAR’s limitations on speech.118 Subsection 1 addresses the 
strength of the government’s reason to regulate.119 Subsection 2 discusses the 
standards by which the DDTC makes its licensing decisions.120 Finally, Subsec-
tion 3 examines the sufficiency of the ITAR’s procedural safeguards.121 
1. The Government Interest Behind the ITAR’s Limitations on Speech 
First, to avoid constitutional infirmity, a licensing scheme restricting speech 
must serve an important government interest.122 This consideration is largely 
duplicative of the requirement of having a compelling government interest for a 
content-neutral restriction on speech.123 
The DDTC’s authority to promulgate the ITAR stems from the AECA.124 
The AECA explicitly states that its regulations are designed to advance the inter-
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (holding that a statute regulating sexually explicit speech should be 
treated as a content-neutral restriction because its purpose was to target crime); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 
10; see supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (discussing the secondary effects doctrine). 
 116 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1286–90. In Chi Mak, for example, the Ninth Circuit mentioned 
“prior restraint,” but did not apply the Freedman procedural requirements to the ITAR. See Chi Mak, 
683 F.3d at 1136. Karn held that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ITAR on prior restraint 
grounds. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 12–13; see also Posey, 864 F.2d at 1496–97 (finding that the ITAR 
does not violate the First Amendment without applying the prior restraint analysis). 
 117 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1286; 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2014) (stating that the DDTC has 
authority to regulate defense articles and technical data); § 120.11 (defining information falling within 
the public domain); § 120.17(a) (stating that “export” means transmitting regulated articles outside the 
United States, or disclosing the information to a foreign government or person); § 125.1(a) (stating 
that “technical data” in the public domain is not subject to the ITAR’s licensing requirement). 
 118 See infra notes 122–165 and accompanying text. 
 119 See infra notes 122–129 and accompanying text. 
 120 See infra notes 130–145 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 146–165 and accompanying text. 
 122 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164–65 
(2002); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575–76 (1941). 
 123 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 US. 367, 376–77 (1968); supra notes 71–74 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the factors relevant to the constitutionality of a content-neutral restriction on 
speech). 
 124 See The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2012); 22 C.F.R. 
§ 120.1(a) (2014). 
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ests of world peace, as well as United States foreign policy and national securi-
ty.125 Yet, in 1971, in New York Times Co. v. United States, a majority of the Su-
preme Court held that national security interests alone do not justify a prior re-
straint.126 Accordingly, in Bernstein, the court stated that national security con-
cerns alone do not justify the prior restraint imposed by the ITAR.127 The AECA, 
however, also gives the Executive Branch authority to promulgate regulations to 
advance world peace and foreign policy concerns.128 Even if world peace and 
foreign policy are insufficient, or are too similar to national security interests to 
justify restriction, courts are unlikely to review policy determinations by the po-
litical branches.129 
2. The DDTC’s Licensing Standards 
Second, a licensing scheme must also have clear standards that effectively 
remove the licensing official’s discretion.130 The DDTC process for licensing 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (stating that the President has authority to regulate the export of de-
fense articles to further national security and foreign policy); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10 (noting that the 
rationale of the ITAR is to promote vital national security interests); 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (stating that 
the purpose of the ITAR is to advance national security and foreign policy). 
 126 See 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). The case consisted of nine separate opinions re-
garding the circumstances in which the government interest is, if ever, strong enough to justify enjoin-
ing publication. See id. at 714–62. For example, Justice Hugo Black concluded that no law could 
constitutionally restrict the press. See id. at 717–18 (Black, J., concurring). By contrast, Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr. stated that such restraints are permissible in extremely narrow circumstances, 
perhaps limited to times the United States is at war. See id. at 725–26 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 127 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288. Given the fractured decision in New York Times Co., its 
applicability to preventing the publication of technical data is unclear. See 403 U.S. at 714–62. Most 
significantly, it is not clear that posting technical data online, 3D CAD files in particular, occupies a 
sufficiently high place on the spectrum of First Amendment values, such that it warrants the highest 
levels of protection. See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1136 (implicitly stating that the ITAR does not govern 
highest value speech because it specifically excludes from its scope certain high value speech, such as 
scholarly works). 
 128 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (“In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of 
the United States, the President is authorized to control the import and the export of defense articles 
and defense services . . . .”). Accordingly, national security arguably is not the only justification for 
regulation. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714; Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288. Other courts have 
acknowledged the importance of the government interests advanced by the ITAR. See Chi Mak, 683 
F. 3d at 1135–36; Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10–12. 
 129 See Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432–33 (holding that issues closely connected to foreign policy and 
national security are non-justiciable); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11–12 (holding that the impact a particu-
lar article would have on a foreign military is a political question); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 
280, 292 (1981) (holding that matters closely connected to foreign policy and national security are 
rarely appropriate for judicial evaluation). 
 130 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 770 (1988); Bernstein, 
945 F. Supp. at 1289; supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement that 
licensing schemes restricting speech must limit the government’s discretion in issuing or denying 
licenses in order to survive constitutional scrutiny). 
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consists of two primary steps.131 First, one must first determine whether the 
ITAR applies to the article or technical data to be exported.132 If any ambiguity 
exists as to whether the ITAR governs the particular article or technical data, the 
distributor should submit a Commodity Jurisdiction request.133 Second, if the 
article or technical data is subject to the ITAR, the distributor must obtain ap-
proval from the DDTC by applying for the appropriate license.134 
The USML provides the criteria for determining whether an article is, in the 
first instance, a regulable defense article or technical data.135 If the technical data 
at issue does not qualify as a defense article, then the DDTC has no authority to 
regulate its export.136 The USML further provides a non-exhaustive list of eight 
enumerated factors based on which the DDTC may deny a license.137 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(c) (2014) (stating certain grounds of ineligibility); § 120.4(a) (stating 
that the DDTC uses the Commodity Jurisdiction procedure to determine whether the USML covers a 
specific article); § 120.17 (defining export); § 125.1 (stating that the ITAR governs the export of un-
classified technical data); § 127.1 (stating that one violates the ITAR by exporting technical data 
without the required license). 
 132 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(a); see also § 121.1(I)(i) (defining technical data as it pertains to firearms 
up to .50 caliber). 
 133 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(a); supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text (explaining the procedure for 
the Commodity Jurisdiction request). 
 134 See 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(a) (stating that one must acquire a license before exporting a defense 
article or technical data, and listing the relevant forms). DSP-5 licenses are for permanent exports for 
unclassified articles or technical data. Id. 
 135 See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (stating that technical data is “information . . . required for the 
design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or 
modification of defense articles,” including “blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or 
documentation”); § 121.1(I)(i) (incorporating the definition of technical data in § 120.10 into the 
USML); § 121.1(I)(j)(1) (stating that a Category I firearm is “weapon not over .50 caliber (12.7mm) 
which is designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or which may be readily convert-
ed to do so”). 
 136 See 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(a) (stating that the DDTC must approve exports of defense articles). 
 137 See 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a) (2014). These grounds for denial include when: (1) the DDTC de-
termines that denying the license furthers world peace, national security, or foreign policy; (2) the 
DDTC believes the applicant already violated the ITAR or other export restrictions; (3) the applicant 
is charged or indicted with violating certain criminal statutes; (4) the applicant has been convicted of 
violating certain criminal statutes; (5) the applicant is ineligible to contract with or receive a license 
from any federal agency; (6) the applicant, manufacturer, or other party to the export (including par-
ties with an interest in the export) has been debarred, suspended, or is ineligible to receive a license 
from any federal agency; (7) the applicant omitted information expressly required for an application, 
exemption, or other authorization under the ITAR; (8) the applicant is subject to other relevant sanc-
tions under U.S. laws. See id.; see also § 127.7(a)–(c) (stating that the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political-Military Affairs may “debar”—i.e. prohibit from export—any individual charged with or 
already convicted of certain crimes). Even when the applicant has been convicted of an enumerated 
crime, the DDTC retains discretion to issue licenses, although when limited conditions are satisfied. 
§ 127.7(b)–(c) (stating that the DDTC retains discretionary authority, under limited circumstances, to 
grant licenses to applicants convicted of criminal statutes). 
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The process of applying for a license to export defense articles provides 
some insight into the criteria considered by the DDTC.138 For example, appli-
cants for permanent export licenses must submit Form DSP-5, which requires 
information regarding various aspects of the applicant’s intended export.139 Also, 
as a matter of policy, the DDTC denies licenses for the export of defense articles 
to certain countries.140 
In Bernstein, the only case to evaluate the ITAR as a prior restraint, the 
court referred to the ITAR as “a paradigm of standardless discretion.”141 Alt-
hough the ITAR requires certain information from applicants, the court held that 
the ITAR does not limit the licensing official’s ability to approve or deny appli-
cations.142 The ITAR further gives the DDTC the authority to deny, revoke, sus-
pend, or amend licenses whenever “otherwise advisable.”143 The court empha-
sized the effect unpredictable licensing had on commercial vendors of cryptog-
raphy software.144 Accordingly, the Bernstein court held that the ITAR was un-
constitutional due to the broad discretion conferred to the DDTC, leaving a sub-
stantial risk of arbitrary or discriminatory licensing decisions.145 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Guidelines of Completion of a 
Form DSP-5, Application/License for Temporary Export of Unclassified Defense Articles, https://
www.pmddtc.state.gov/DTRADE/documents/DTrade_DSP_5_Instructions.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/8E65-ML5R (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) [hereinafter “DSP-5 Instructions”]. For temporary 
export licenses, applicants must submit a Form DSP-73. 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(a)(2). 
 139 See 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(a)(2). Information the applicant must disclose includes, among other 
things, the specific countries of export, the USML category, the value of the data, and the purpose of the 
data. See DSP-5 Instructions, supra note 138, at 3–8. 
 140 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(a) (stating that it is United States policy to deny licenses to export defense 
articles to Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, or any country currently facing 
a United States embargo). The ITAR allows the DDTC to make an exception to these prohibitions 
based on undue hardship. § 126.3. 
 141 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289; see also Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757, 770 (holding that an 
ordinance was unconstitutional because it granted the mayor unfettered discretion to grant or deny 
licenses for public speech). 
 142 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289; 22 C.F.R. § 126.7 (stating that the DDTC “may” deny a li-
cense on certain grounds); § 126.13 (stating that certain information is required when applying for a 
license through the ITAR); § 127.7(b)–(c) (stating that the DDTC retains discretion, in certain circum-
stances, to grant licenses to applicants otherwise ineligible); see also § 125.2(a) (stating that a DSP-5 
license is required for the export of unclassified technical data); DSP-5 Instructions, supra note 138, at 
3–8 (stating that the applicant must disclose, among other things, the intended country of export, a 
description of the transaction, a description of the technical data, and the dollar value of the commodi-
ty). 
 143 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289; 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (2014). 
 144 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289–90. The court relied on an industry report, which stated that 
the lack of predictability and the risk of discriminatory licensing inhibited the development of com-
mercial products. Id. 
 145 945 F. Supp. at 1289. Bernstein did not, however, engage in a political question analysis. See 
id. at 1286–93. Courts are unlikely to second guess ultimate licensing decisions made on foreign poli-
cy grounds. See Haig, 453 U.S. at 292; Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432–33; Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11–12. 
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3. The Freedman Procedural Protections and the ITAR 
A constitutionally valid licensing scheme must also provide certain proce-
dural protections to minimize the risk of censorship.146 The protections require 
(1) that the licensing official either grant or deny the license within a brief, fixed 
period of time; (2) the decision must be subject to prompt judicial review; and 
(3) the government generally must bear both the burden of going to court to sup-
press the speech and the burden to prove the speech is not protected.147 Although 
the first two elements are always required, the government may not need to initi-
ate action or bear the burden of proof when the licensing decision is purely min-
isterial and the applicant has a strong incentive to go to court.148 
Although the ITAR provides a specific ten day limitation for the initial des-
ignation of an article on the USML upon submission of the Commodity Jurisdic-
tion request, the ITAR does not impose a time limitation on the licensing deter-
mination itself.149 If the DDTC does not provide a final determination within 45 
days, the applicant can request an expedited determination.150 By contrast, nei-
ther the ITAR nor the DSP-5 instructions contain an explicit time limitation with 
respect to the actual licensing determination, indicating that the DDTC can hold 
onto an application for an unlimited amount of time.151 
The AECA specifically precludes the possibility of judicial review for the 
initial designation of an article as belonging on the USML.152 Although the des-
ignation of an item as a defense article is distinct from the licensing decision 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227–30 (1990) (plurality opinion); Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1965). 
 147 See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227–30; Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59; Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 
1289. 
 148 See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228–30 (holding that the government did not bear either burden 
because a ministerial licensing scheme that restricted expression integral to an applicant’s business 
provided a strong incentive for the applicant to go to court). In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, the 
Court held that ministerial determinations, unlike content-based restrictions, are not presumptively 
invalid. See id. at 229. Additionally, the business owners in FW/PBS needed the license at issue to 
maintain their business. Id. The necessity of the license provided a strong incentive for the business 
owners to challenge a denial in court, making it unnecessary to impose that burden on the government. 
Id. at 229–30. By contrast, the film distributors in Freedman v. Maryland were less motivated to chal-
lenge denials. See id. (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–60) (stating that the licensees in FW/PBS have 
much more at stake than those in Freedman); see also supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text 
(noting that the value of the speech may also play a role in content-neutral restrictions). 
 149 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289; 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(e) (2014). 
 150 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(e). 
 151 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (noting that the ITAR places no time limit on licensing 
decisions); 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(b); DSP-5 Instructions, supra note 138, at 3–8. 
 152 See The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h) (2012) (“The designation by the Pres-
ident (or by an official to whom the President’s functions . . . have been duly delegated), in regula-
tions issued under this section, of items as defense articles or defense services for the purposes of this 
section shall not be subject to judicial review.”). 
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itself, the USML designation makes the license necessary.153 The ITAR does not, 
however, foreclose sharing technical data domestically.154 It is also unclear that 
the exemption from judicial review would immunize designations from constitu-
tional challenges, rather than challenges based on the DDTC’s determination that 
an article meets the specifications of a USML category.155 Even if applicants 
assert a constitutional challenge to an article on the USML, courts still may de-
cline to hold designations unconstitutional, based on the political question doc-
trine.156 
In contrast, the licensing decision itself may be subject to judicial review, 
because the ITAR does not specifically prohibit judicial review of the licensing 
decision.157 The ITAR provides a denied applicant the opportunity to request that 
the DDTC reconsider a denial, and allows the applicant to provide additional 
information.158 The presence of internal administrative review, however, is typi-
cal administrative practice and does not preclude the possibility of judicial re-
view.159 Nevertheless, the political question doctrine may also prevent judicial 
review of the licensing determination itself.160 
Finally, the ITAR does not address whether the government bears the bur-
den of going to court to suppress the speech or proving that the restriction is a 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(a). A license is not required if the article or data falls within the public 
domain exception. Id.; § 120.11; see also Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1292 n.13 (stating that the preclu-
sion of judicial review applies only to initial designations of defense articles, not to licensing deci-
sions). 
 154 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a) (defining “export” to mean transmission of defense articles or tech-
nical data outside the United States or to foreign entities). 
 155 See Karn, 925 F. Supp at 8–9 (stating that both parties agreed that 18 U.S.C. § 2778(h) did not 
prevent constitutional challenges to USML designations); see supra note 36 and accompanying text 
(discussing the controversy over whether Congress can preclude judicial review of constitutional 
questions). 
 156 See Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432–33; Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1223; Martinez, 904 F.2d at 602; 
Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11–12; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
political question doctrine allows courts to avoid deciding issues constitutionally committed to other 
branches of government). 
 157 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1292 n.13. In fact, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (2012), states that any person adversely affected by agency action is entitled to judicial review. 
5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 158 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(c)–(d) (2014). 
 159 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (holding that congressional intent to preclude 
judicial review of constitutional questions must be explicit); see also 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)–(c) (describ-
ing the standard procedures for internal administrative review of agency action). 
 160 Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1223 (holding that the extent to which an article would significantly con-
tribute to a foreign country’s military power is an unreviewable political question). The DDTC may 
deny licenses based on its determination that export of the article will negatively affect United States 
national security and foreign policy. 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1). The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that 
questions relating to national security and foreign policy are rarely appropriate for judicial review. Haig, 
453 U.S. at 292. 
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valid restraint on speech.161 Yet, the government is not required to bear this bur-
den where the ultimate licensing decisions are ministerial in nature, because 
ministerial decisions have been recognized as less likely to result in content-
based censorship.162 The ITAR provides some objective criteria for the initial 
USML designation, and some objective standards for licensing decisions.163 As 
one court found, however, the DDTC’s ability to deny licenses based on con-
cerns of foreign policy and national security arguably leaves significant room for 
discretion.164 Accordingly, the court noted the DDTC can deny or approve li-
censes arbitrarily, and thus must prove that the suppressive effect of denying the 
license is justified.165 
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL CATCH-22: THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES JUDICIAL 
REVIEW, YET COURTS WILL NOT REVIEW THE ITAR  
BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Evaluating the International Traffic in Arms Regulations’ (“ITAR”) effect on 
free expression involves a difficult balancing act between strong government in-
terests and an individual’s right to free speech.166 This Part concludes that courts 
are ultimately unlikely to find the ITAR is unconstitutional as it pertains to 3D 
CAD files for firearms.167 Section A asserts that 3D CAD files for firearms quali-
fy as technical data under the ITAR.168 Section B then argues that firearm CAD 
files do not occupy a high position on the scale of First Amendment values.169 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (stating that the ITAR contains no burden on the govern-
ment to go to court to prove the validity of the restriction on speech). 
 162 See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228–30; Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59; supra notes 87–92 and ac-
companying text (describing the procedural safeguards for licensing restraints on speech). Because the 
Supreme Court has not yet considered the ministerial exception doctrine in the context of high-value 
speech, it may be limited to low-value speech. See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 
774, 779–80 (2004) (citing FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 779–81) (stating that in FW/PBS, the Supreme Court 
held that the government need not bear the burden of proof in the adult business licensing context); 
see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (stating that the Court affords 
protection according to the value of the speech); Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1136 (indicating that at least 
some speech regulated by the ITAR is not high value). 
 163 See 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(2)–(8); supra notes 130–140 and accompanying text (discussing the 
criteria considered by the DDTC in granting or denying a license to export under the ITAR). 
 164 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (stating that the ITAR is a “paradigm of standardless 
discretion”); 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (2014). 
 165 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289–90; 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1); see also supra notes 83–92 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Freedman safeguards and the requirement that licensing schemes 
restricting speech utilize objective criteria). 
 166 Compare United States v. Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that there is a 
strong government national security interest in regulating data through the USML), with Bernstein v. 
U.S. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1289–90 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the ITAR is an un-
constitutional prior restraint on speech). 
 167 See infra notes 173–257 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 173–186 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra notes 187–202 and accompanying text. 
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Section C then reasons that, although the ITAR is a content-based restriction, the 
purpose of the statute is not to regulate speech, but to target secondary effects 
associated with the proliferation of technical data related to weapons.170 Section 
C also contends that the ITAR passes the O’Brien test, because the legitimacy of 
the government interest involved in advancing world peace, national security, and 
foreign policy outweighs the exporter’s interest in disclosing technical data to 
foreign entities.171 Finally, Section D concludes that First Amendment jurispru-
dence creates a constitutional catch-22 when applied to the ITAR, because courts 
will likely decline to review the Directorate of Defense Controls’ (“DDTC”) li-
censing decisions, even though such review is necessary.172 
A. CAD Files for 3D Firearms are Technical Data Under the ITAR, and 
Posting Technical Data Online Qualifies as Exportation 
3D CAD files, which allow users to print functional weapons, or even a 
functional part of a weapon, qualify as technical data under the ITAR.173 Tech-
nical data is broadly defined as information necessary for the manufacture of a 
defense article, designated on the United States Munitions List (“USML”).174 
The CAD file for the Liberator allows a 3D printer user to create a Category I 
.380 caliber firearm.175 Although the Liberator may fire only one shot before 
falling apart, the USML does not distinguish between high and low quality fire-
arms.176 Therefore, the CAD file is technical data directly related to the manu-
facture of a defense article listed on the USML.177 Similarly, the CAD file for an 
AR-15 lower receiver qualifies as technical data.178 Although the ITAR does not 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See infra notes 203–210 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 211–231 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 232–257 and accompanying text. 
 173 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2014); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 3–4. 
 174 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10. Category I of the USML includes nonautomatic, semiautomatic, and 
fully automatic firearms, up to .50 caliber. § 121.1(I)(a)–(b). A firearm is further defined as a weapon 
designed to fire a projectile from an explosive force. § 121(I)(j)(1). Category I also includes technical 
data related to such firearms. § 121.1(I)(i). 
 175 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(I)(a), 121.1(I)(j)(1) (stating that firearms up to .50 caliber are defense 
articles, and defining firearm as a weapon that fires a projectile by explosive force); Greenberg, supra 
note 12. 
 176 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(I)(a); § 121.1(I)(j)(1). The Liberator withstood firearm testing relatively 
well, depending on the printer material used. Andy Greenberg, 3D-Printed Gun Stands Up to Agents’ 
Testfiring—Except When It Explodes, FORBES.COM, Nov. 14, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/andy
greenberg/2013/11/14/3d-printed-gun-stands-up-to-federal-agents-testfiring-except-when-it-explodes-
video/, archived at http://perma.cc/FP7K-HZFE (noting that a version of the Liberator printed with 
lower quality plastics exploded on its first firing, and another printed with higher quality material 
remained in tact after firing eight rounds). 
 177 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10; § 121.1(I)(a); § 121.1(I)(i)–(j)(1); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 4. 
 178 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10; § 121.1(I)(a); § 121.1(I)(i)–(j)(1); Salazar, supra note 11. 
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specifically define the receiver as a firearm, the CAD file directly relates to the 
manufacture of a functional AR-15.179 
Moreover, placing technical data on the Internet constitutes exportation un-
der the ITAR.180 Posting the file online effectively makes the information public-
ly accessible to foreign entities.181 Without the ability to regulate the disclosure 
of technical data via the Internet, the ITAR would be wholly unable to prevent 
the dissemination of technical data for defense articles.182 
Furthermore, CAD files for the Liberator and the AR-15 lower receiver are 
unlikely to fall within the public domain exception.183 The very act of placing 
technical data in the public domain requires either a license or prior approval 
from a government agency.184 Therefore, the fact that the Internet is accessible 
from a library is irrelevant if the information became available in violation of the 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(I)(a) (2014); § 121.1(I)(i)–(j)(1). The Gun Control Act of 1968 defines 
the receiver as the firearm, and the receiver is typically the part of the weapon containing the serial num-
ber. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (2012); Camiel, supra note 11. Therefore, the 
CAD file is directly related to a significant component of the AR-15. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3); 22 
C.F.R. § 121(I)(i). 
 180 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288 (noting that posting files on the Internet is exportation 
under the ITAR because it involves sending the information outside the United States “in any man-
ner”) (citing 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1)); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 3. Each subsequent download by a 
foreign entity may constitution an additional unauthorized export. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 3. In 
Junger v. Daley, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that posting a file on the Internet 
constituted an export under the Export Administration regulations. 209 F.3d 481, 483 (6th Cir. 2000). 
Unlike the ITAR, however, the Export Administration Regulations explicitly state that downloading 
from the Internet, or causing information to be downloaded, constitutes an export. See id.; see also 22 
C.F.R. § 120.17; 22 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9)(ii) (2014). 
 181 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 3–4 (noting that Internet 
users downloaded the Liberator CAD file approximately 100,000 times before the State Department 
instructed Defense Distributed to remove it). 
 182 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (stating that exporting includes disclosing information across borders 
or to a foreign entity “in any manner”). The fact that users downloaded the Liberator CAD file over 
100,000 times demonstrates the necessity of such power. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 4. Indeed, it 
would be a strange policy to hold that the DDTC can prohibit directly mailing (or e-mailing) technical 
data, but so long as the information is posted online, where anyone in the world can access it, the 
disclosure falls outside of the ITAR’s reach. See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288; Goldstein, supra 
note 13, at 3–4. 
 183 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.11; § 125.1(a); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that, for the purpos-
es of the ITAR, the mere fact that information is available on the Internet does not automatically mean 
that information is within the public domain). 
 184 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (stating that export includes sending regulated information outside the 
United States “in any manner”); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that the initial act of transmit-
ting technical data into the public domain without an export license may constitute a violation of the 
ITAR). 
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ITAR.185 Accordingly, Defense Distributed exported its CAD files under the 
ITAR’s definition.186 
B. CAD Files for Firearms and the Spectrum of First Amendment Values 
CAD files for firearms do not occupy a high position on the scale of First 
Amendment values.187 Typical examples of high-value speech include political 
speech, freedom of the press, and speech connected to other substantive 
rights.188 Distributors of 3D firearm CAD files could argue that the act of posting 
their CAD files online is political speech entitled to the highest protection.189 By 
posting the file online, they could claim to be expressing their political views 
about democratizing gun possession.190 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a) (2014) (defining public domain to include information available at 
bookstores and public libraries); § 120.17(a) (defining export to include transmission of a defense 
article to a foreign entity “in any manner”); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that the act of 
transmitting information into the public domain is regulated by the ITAR’s export restrictions). 
 186 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288 (finding that posting technical data on the Internet is func-
tionally equivalent to transmitting the data outside of the United States); 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (defining 
“export” to include transmitting technical data outside of the United States); Goldstein, supra note 13, 
at 3–4 (stating that the ITAR regulates the act of making technical data available via the Internet). 
 187 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (stating that there is a spectrum 
of First Amendment values); Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1136 (stating that the ITAR creates specific excep-
tions for high-value speech); supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (discussing how courts treat 
restrictions on speech differently based on the value of the speech at issue). The CAD file may be 
commercial speech, which the Supreme Court defines as “speech which does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.” See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). Defense 
Distributed, however, allowed users to download the file at no charge, so the ultimate applicability of 
commercial speech rules is unclear. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66; Salazar, supra note 11. 
 188 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715–16 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the protections of a free press are essential to democracy); NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 428–30 (1963) (holding that a state law effectively preventing the NAACP from litigating 
civil rights claims violated the First Amendment). In 1963, in NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a state statute because the statute precluded the only meaningful avenue of speech availa-
ble to the NAACP to ensure equal protection under the law. See 371 U.S. at 429–30; see also Watch-
tower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 161 (2002) (holding that a 
licensing requirement for door-to-door canvassing was unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah’s wit-
nesses because it limited expression connected to the free exercise of religion); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (stating that the Court invalidates neutral, generally applicable laws as 
violations of the Free Exercise clause when they implicated other constitutional rights, including free 
expression). 
 189 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989) (stating that political expression is among the 
most highly valued forms of speech); see also supra note 59–65 and accompanying text (discussing 
the varying levels of scrutiny that courts apply to restrictions on speech, based on the speech’s value). 
 190 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411. In a television interview, a founder of Defense Distributed, 
Cody Wilson, indicated that the purpose of posting the CAD files online was to make a political 
statement. The Glenn Beck Program, THE BLAZE (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.video.
theblaze.com/media/video.jsp?content_id=25560075&topic_id=24584158, archived at http://perma.
cc/B7WV-NGFF (at 4:40). 
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Simply claiming that expression is “political,” however, does not automati-
cally entitle it to the highest level of protection.191 For example, in 1968, in 
United States v. O’Brien, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case involving an in-
dividual who protested the Vietnam War by burning his draft card.192 The Court 
upheld a law prohibiting destruction of draft cards because the statute did not 
intend to suppress the speech, but rather intended to maintain the integrity of the 
draft.193 By contrast, in 1989, in Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court overturned 
a conviction for disturbing the peace, premised on a public flag burning demon-
stration to express dissatisfaction with the government.194 The Court emphasized 
that the First Amendment’s most vital purpose is protecting speech that express-
es and induces political dissatisfaction.195 Accordingly, posting CAD files for 
firearms online more closely resembles the case in O’Brien than the circum-
stances of Johnson.196 Similar to the law banning the destruction of draft cards, 
the ITAR does not set out to restrict free expression, but rather exists to advance 
national security and foreign policy objectives.197 
Restrictions on speech that implicate other substantive rights are more like-
ly to violate the First Amendment.198 Yet, it is not clear that regulating the distri-
bution of CAD files for 3D firearms online meaningfully affects another sub-
stantive right—namely the right to keep and bear arms.199 Arguably, by restrict-
                                                                                                                           
 191 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 US. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting the argument that any con-
duct can be labeled speech whenever the individual intends to express an idea). 
 192 Id. at 369. 
 193 Id. at 375. 
 194 491 U.S. at 404, 408–12. 
 195 Id. at 408–09. 
 196 Compare Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 (holding that expressing political dissatisfaction by burn-
ing the American flag is entitled to strong First Amendment protections), with O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 
376 (stating that expression is not automatically entitled to strong First Amendment protection be-
cause he or she proclaims it is a statement of political discontent). 
 197 See The Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2012) (stating that the Execu-
tive Branch has authority to regulate the exportation of defense articles to further national security, 
foreign policy, and world peace); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377–79 (holding that Congress’s power to 
establish the draft is explicitly established by the Constitution and is “beyond question”); Karn v. U.S. 
Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 11–12 (D.D.C. 1996) (declining to scrutinize the designation of a de-
fense article on the USML because it is a foreign policy judgment reserved for the Executive Branch). 
The ITAR authorizes the DDTC to deny a license application if it determines permitting the export 
undermines the goals of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”). 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (2014). 
 198 See Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 161 (noting that an ordinance prohibiting handbilling, without 
respect to content, implicated high-value speech because it infringed on a traditional method of reli-
gious expression); Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82 (stating that the Court invalidates neutral, generally 
applicable laws as violations of the Free Exercise clause when they implicated other constitutional 
rights, including free expression); Button, 371 U.S. at 428–30 (holding that a law limiting the 
NAACP’s ability to bring civil rights claims was unconstitutional because the act precluded the only 
meaningful avenue of speech available to ensure equal protection under the law). 
 199 See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”); District of Columbia v. 
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ing the dissemination of CAD files for firearms, the ITAR may implicate rights 
protected by the Second Amendment.200 The ITAR’s effect on Second Amend-
ment rights, however, appears tenuous at best.201 The ITAR does not foreclose 
all meaningful exercise of Second Amendment rights because the regulations do 
not prohibit an individual from possessing or creating a gun—even a 3D printed 
one—but merely from disclosing the CAD file to foreign entities.202 
C. The ITAR Under Intermediate Scrutiny: The O’Brien Test 
Ultimately, the majority of courts considering the ITAR and the First 
Amendment have incorrectly concluded that the ITAR is content neutral, but 
have properly applied intermediate scrutiny.203 The ITAR regulates the export of 
technical data on the basis of its contents, and is therefore a content-based re-
striction.204 For example, if Defense Distributed had posted only CAD files for 
                                                                                                                           
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624–25 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects weapons that were 
commonly used for a lawful purpose at the time of the founding). 
 200 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25, 628 (stating that the handgun is the weapon Americans over-
whelmingly choose for self-defense). Some argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in 2008, in District 
of Columbia v. Heller, could be interpreted to also ensure a person’s right to create his or her own gun. 
See id.; Jensen-Haxel, supra note 7, at 474–84 (arguing that Heller could be interpreted to guarantee 
an individual right to manufacture personal firearms). 
 201 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25. Heller leaves open the question regarding how similar a 
weapon must be to weapons used for lawful purposes at the time of the founding. See id.; Jensen-
Haxel, supra note 7, at 487. Accordingly, the Second Amendment only protects plastic firearms if 
they are similar enough to weapons used for lawful purposes in the late eighteenth-century. See Hel-
ler, 554 U.S. at 624–25. Currently, however, federal law prohibits weapons that do not set off stand-
ard metal detectors. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1) (2012). For the purposes of that 
section, however, the AR-15 lower receiver does not qualify as a firearm. See § 922(p)(2)(A) (stating 
that the firearm does not include the receiver in that particular section). 
 202 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; § 123.1(a). Accordingly, the ITAR’s potential impact on Second 
Amendment rights is far more limited than the law at issue in Button, which effectively prohibited the 
NAACP from meaningfully pursuing equal protection rights. See Button, 371 U.S. at 429–30 (holding 
that a statute was unconstitutional because it foreclosed the only mode of expression to achieve goals 
of equal protection). 
 203 See, e.g., Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–35 (holding that the ITAR is not content-based because it 
regulates based on the data’s function rather than its content); Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288 (apply-
ing strict scrutiny to conclude that the ITAR is an unconstitutional restriction on speech); Karn, 925 F. 
Supp. at 10 (holding that the ITAR is content neutral given the purpose of the regulation); see also 
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (holding that facially content-based 
restrictions on speech designed to target regulable secondary effects may be treated as content neu-
tral). The First Amendment limits the ability of legislatures to regulate speech based on a particular 
subject matter, even if the regulation’s purpose is “neutral.” See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
95–96 (1972) (stating that the First Amendment precludes the government from restricting speech due 
to “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content”) (emphasis added). 
 204 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661, 665–66 (2004) (holding that a law regulating a 
particular subject, without reference to a point of view, was content-based); Burson v. Freeman, 504 
U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that restrictions based on the topic of speech are 
content-based restrictions); 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(a) (2014) (stating that, through the Commodity Jurisdic-
tion procedure, the DDTC determines whether an article meets the qualifications of articles designated 
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cell phone cases, which are not on the USML, the DDTC would not be in-
volved.205 The mere fact that the ITAR does not suppress a particular point of 
view does not mean the ITAR is content-neutral.206 
Yet establishing that the ITAR’s restrictions on technical data are content-
based by no means ends the matter.207 The ITAR regulates speech based on its 
content to address possible secondary effects stemming from the dissemination 
of technical data to foreign entities.208 The ITAR does not set out to restrict 
communication, but rather strives to protect substantial national security and 
foreign policy objectives.209 Accordingly, the ITAR should be subject to inter-
mediate scrutiny, as a content-neutral restriction.210 
                                                                                                                           
on the USML). But see Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–35 (holding that the ITAR is not content-based as 
applied to technical data because it regulates based on the data’s “function” rather than its “view-
point”). 
 205 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288. Although the court in Bernstein specifically addressed a 
different category of the USML, the analysis is the same for Category I. See id.; § 121.1(I)(a); 
§ 121.1(I)(a)(i). The DDTC cannot differentiate between a CAD file for a cell phone case and a CAD 
file for a firearm without some reference to the content. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48; Bernstein, 945 F. 
Supp. at 1288. 
 206 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288 (indicating that Category XIII(b) of the USML is a con-
tent-based restriction because it specifically targets expression of a particular subject). 
 207 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–49 (holding that an ordinance regulating the expression of sexually 
explicit speech should be treated as content neutral because its purpose was to address undesirable 
secondary effects). The restrictions in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. were facially content-
based restrictions, applying only to businesses engaged in sexually explicit speech. See id.; see also 
Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 661, 665 (holding that a law regulating a particular subject of speech is content-
based). Nevertheless, the Court treated the restriction as content neutral because the purpose of the 
law was not to restrict speech, but to limit illegal activity that often accompanied such businesses. 
Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–49. 
 208 See The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2012) (stating that the Executive 
Branch has the authority to regulate the exportation of defense articles to advance the interests of 
national security, foreign policy, and world peace); Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–35 (holding that the 
ITAR serves the government’s interest in regulating the dissemination of military information); Karn, 
925 F. Supp. at 10 (stating that the ITAR regulates encryption software to limit foreign intelligence 
entities’ ability to encode communications); see also 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (stating that the DDTC 
may deny a license to further the objectives of the AECA). Even the court in Bernstein acknowledged 
that the ITAR’s purpose could be content neutral. See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288–89. The court, 
however, found the ITAR unconstitutional as a prior restraint, even assuming the regulation is content 
neutral. See id. 
 209 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–35; Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10; 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1); see also 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 375 (holding that a statute did not violate the First Amendment because its pur-
pose is not to punish the expression of views). 
 210 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48 (holding that a restriction targeting businesses engaged sexual-
ly explicit speech was constitutional because the law’s purpose was to eliminate prostitution and other 
crimes commonly accompanying such businesses). The ITAR treats technical data differently from 
other expression, much like the ordinance at issue in Renton, which treated sexually explicit speech 
differently. See id. at 47; 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2014); § 121.1(I)(a); § 121.1(I)(i); § 123.1. Neverthe-
less, the ITAR should be scrutinized as content-neutral because the purpose of the statute is to address 
compelling secondary effects. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a); Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1134–35 (holding that 
the ITAR is content neutral and applying the O’Brien test). 
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When examined as a content-neutral regulation, the ITAR passes the 
O’Brien test.211 The power to regulate the international exchange of arms falls 
within the constitutional power of Congress.212 Furthermore, the regulations 
serve a compelling government interest, are unrelated to the suppression of 
speech, and are narrowly tailored to serve that purpose.213 Finally, 3D firearm 
CAD files do not constitute such high value speech to outweigh the government 
interest in regulating the disclosure of technical data.214 
The government has a compelling interest in preventing the unfettered dis-
tribution of firearm CAD files, unrelated to limiting expression.215 Plastic fire-
arms present a distinct danger to the places where security is most important—
beyond metal detectors.216 Allowing wide distribution of plastic guns, even guns 
capable of firing only one shot, presents new security threats to airports, court-
houses, schools, and government buildings.217 Furthermore, the ability to print 
                                                                                                                           
 211 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77 (stating that a content-neutral restriction is justified if it “is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if 
the incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest”); Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1135 (holding that the ITAR is a constitutionally 
valid content-neutral restriction on expression). 
 212 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10 (establishing that Congress has power to regulate foreign com-
merce, the value of foreign currency, and approve treaties with foreign countries). Congress granted 
the President power to regulate international arms traffic. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a). 
 213 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a); Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1135 (noting that the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment interest regulating defense articles is “unquestionable”); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10–12; see 
also Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 722 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 209 F.3d 481 
(6th Cir. 2000) (stating that the government could not as effectively promote its foreign policies goals 
under the similar Export Administration Regulation without its restrictions on speech). 
 214 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1136 (noting that the ITAR creates exceptions for highly protected 
speech); see also supra notes 187–202 and accompanying text (concluding that 3D CAD files for 
firearms do not warrant the highest levels of First Amendment protection). Highly protected speech 
exempted from the ITAR’s restrictions includes the public domain exception, for which the firearm 
CAD files do not qualify. See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1136; 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5); § 120.11; see also 
supra notes 183–186 and accompanying text (arguing that the firearm CAD files do not fall within the 
public domain exception). 
 215 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1). As established 
under the secondary effects analysis, the purpose of the ITAR is not to suppress speech, but to further 
the goals of world peace, national security, and foreign policy. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a); Renton, 475 
U.S. at 47–49. 
 216 See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1) (2012) (banning firearms that do not set 
off standard metal detectors); Evan Perez, ATF Test Show 3-D Guns Lethal as Metal Detection Law 
Expires, CNN, Nov. 15, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/14/politics/3d-guns/, archived at http://
perma.cc/67KE-KEL5 (stating that one could modify the Liberator’s design to completely exclude 
any metal part by utilizing a ceramic firing pin). See Greenberg, supra note 176 (quoting a spokesper-
son for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives who stated that the Liberator is 
undetectable and that the plastic guns could “make their way into secure facilities”). 
 217 See Memmott, supra note 14 (noting that the Liberator pistol’s incorporation of a steel chunk 
has no effect on gun’s function). Regulation of the CAD files is essential to controlling the prolifera-
tion of plastic 3D guns. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 4 (stating that the Liberator CAD file was 
downloaded 100,000 times before it was removed); Jensen-Haxel, supra note 7, at 463–69 (arguing 
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an AR-15 lower receiver with the click of a button, allows individuals to print 
the only regulated component of the firearm.218 As 3D printing technology ad-
vances and enables printing with stronger materials, including metal, the gov-
ernment interest in regulation of firearm CAD files will only increase.219 
Finally, the proscriptions of the ITAR are narrowly tailored to serve the 
compelling government interests enunciated by the Arms Export Control Act 
(“AECA”).220 First, the restrictions, as applied to CAD files, only apply to tech-
nical data directly related to defense articles on the USML.221 Significantly, the 
ITAR does not regulate information already in the public domain.222 Additional-
ly, the restrictions apply only to moving the data across borders or disclosing it 
to foreign entities.223 Thus, even if denied a license under the ITAR, an individu-
al can still share CAD files for firearms, so long as he or she limits disclosures to 
United States citizens who are in the United States.224 Although posting these 
CAD files on the Internet is likely the most effective way to rapidly disseminate 
schematics domestically, distributors could alternatively distribute the files by 
other means online, or in hard copies.225 The First Amendment does not guaran-
tee the most effective means of protected expression; rather it guarantees some 
effective means for protected expression.226 
                                                                                                                           
that the prospect of easily printable guns in individuals’ homes largely, if not entirely, renders existing 
gun controls obsolete). 
 218 See 27 C.F.R. § 478.92(a)(1) (2014) (stating that manufacturers of firearms must place all 
identifying information, including the serial number, model, and caliber, on the weapon’s receiver); 
Jensen-Haxel, supra note 7, at 452, 464–65 (stating that the receiver is the only individually regulated 
part of a firearm); Camiel, supra note 11 (stating that the lower receiver is the only serialized part of 
an AR-15 rifle). 
 219 See Richard A. D’Aveni, 3-D Printing Will Change the World, HARV. BUS. REV., available at 
http://hbr.org/2013/03/3-d-printing-will-change-the-world/ar/pr, archived at http://perma.cc/LKW2-
VT6M (last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (noting that 3D printing technology will expand and become more 
affordable); SOLID CONCEPTS, supra note 15. 
 220 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a); Chi Mak, 683 F. 3d at 1136; see also Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 720 
(stating that the government could not as effectively promote its foreign policies goals under the 
closely related Export Administration Regulations without restricting speech to some extent). 
 221 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2014); § 121.1(I)(i). 
 222 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1136; 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(b) (stating that technical data does not 
include general scientific information or in the public domain). 
 223 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.16–.17(a). 
 224 See id. 
 225 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 3. These alternative measures do not 
necessarily mean the distributors would escape the reach of the ITAR. See §§ 120.16–.17; § 126.7. 
Unlike posting on the Internet, however, they are not subject to a potential per se rule that the mode of 
distribution qualifies as an export under the ITAR. Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288; § 120.17(a). The 
distribution method, however, must require a way to identify potential purchasers, because disclosing 
technical data to a foreign national even within the United States constitutes an export under the 
ITAR. See §§ 120.16–.17(a). 
 226 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (holding that content-based restrictions on the time, place, and 
manner of speech are constitutionally permissible if they leave open other possibilities for communi-
cation); Stone, supra note 54, at 48–49 (arguing that the Supreme Court applies different standards of 
review depending, in part, on the availability of other means of communication); see also Button, 371 
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Given the significance of the government’s interest in preventing undetect-
able firearms in secure areas, the government interest substantially outweighs the 
costs of the relatively limited restrictions of the ITAR.227 The Court has held that 
government interests such as preventing crimes and the convenient policing of 
public demonstrations justified content-neutral restrictions on speech.228 The 
government interest in preserving high security in sensitive locations, such as 
airports and government buildings, is patently greater than the government inter-
est in reducing prostitution or in avoiding double-booked parades.229 Further-
more, the restriction on public demonstrations in previous cases concerned all 
forms of speech, whereas the relevant portions of the ITAR apply only to tech-
nical data disclosed to foreign entities.230 Accordingly, because the government 
interest is great, and the restriction on speech is less comprehensive than a blan-
ket regulation on all forms of public demonstration, the ITAR clearly passes this 
portion of the O’Brien test.231 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. at 428–30 (holding that a Virginia law keeping the NAACP from litigating was an unconstitu-
tional restraint on speech because it closed the only meaningful avenue for expression). 
 227 See Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1135–36 (noting that the ITAR furthers a strong government interest 
while withholding regulation from high-value speech); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11–12; see also supra 
notes 187–202 and accompanying text (concluding that the ITAR does not regulate high-value 
speech). 
 228 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–52 (holding that the government interest in preventing crimes associat-
ed with purveyors of sexually explicit content justified a restriction on sexually-explicit speech); Cox 
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575–78 (1941) (holding that the government’s interest in the order-
ly administration of parades and public demonstrations justified a restriction requiring government 
approval prior to such demonstrations). The restriction in Renton was not facially content neutral, but 
was nonetheless subject to intermediate scrutiny under the secondary effects doctrine. See Renton, 475 
U.S. at 47–52; supra notes 66–74 and accompanying text (discussing the secondary effects doctrine 
and the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions). 
 229 Compare Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511–13 (1980) (holding that the government’s 
“vital” interest in national security trumped a former CIA employee’s First Amendment right to pub-
lish stories without the CIA’s prior approval), and Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1135–36 (holding that the 
strong government interest in controlling the exportation of technical data justifies regulating the dis-
semination of the data), with Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (holding that a facially content-based restriction 
on speech was justified based on the compelling government interest in eliminating the secondary 
effect of illegal prostitution), and Cox, 312 U.S. at 576 (holding that a city had a sufficiently compel-
ling interest in managing demonstrations and parades on public streets to justify requiring a permit for 
such activities). 
 230 See Cox, 312 U.S. at 575–76 (upholding a restriction on public demonstrations and parades 
because of the government interest in the orderly administration of such activities); 22 C.F.R. 
§ 120.17 (2014) (defining “export” to include transmitting information outside of the United States 
and to foreign entities domestically). 
 231 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–52 (holding that the government interest in reducing crime associ-
ated with business engaged in sexually explicit speech justified restriction); Cox 312 U.S. at 575–76 
(holding that the government interest in the orderly administration of parades and public demonstra-
tions justified requiring permits prior to conducting such activities); Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1135–36 
(noting that the ITAR furthers a strong government interest in national security and foreign policy); 
Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11–12 (holding that the ITAR serves vital government interests in national secu-
rity and foreign policy). 
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D. Courts Will Likely Decline to Conduct the Necessary Judicial Review 
Even though the ITAR survives the O’Brien test, the regulations are none-
theless a flawed licensing scheme due to the absence of procedural protections 
essential to reduce the risk of censorship.232 Although the government has a suf-
ficient compelling interest in regulating the exportation of technical data, the 
ITAR still suffers substantial constitutional deficiencies, such as a lack of objec-
tive licensing criteria, the unlimited time for decisions, and the lack of judicial 
review.233 Nevertheless, because USML designations and the ITAR licensing 
decisions present political questions, courts are unlikely to overturn them as un-
constitutional restrictions of speech.234 
Licensing schemes, however, must have objective standards to remove vir-
tually all discretion from the licensing officials to mitigate the threat of censor-
ship.235 The ITAR provides a number of objective criteria, based upon which the 
DDTC may deny a license application.236 One factor, however, allows the 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965) (establishing procedural requirements 
necessary for a constitutional prior restraint on speech); Bernstein, F. Supp. 945 at 1289 (holding that 
the ITAR does not possess any of the required procedural protections); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City 
of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227–30 (1990) (holding that when the licensing decision is ministerial, not all 
of the procedural protections are required); see supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (discussing 
the procedural safeguards required for a constitutional prior restraint). 
 233 See The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h) (2012) (precluding judicial review of 
USML designations); Chi Mak, 683 F.3d at 1135–36 (noting that the ITAR furthers a strong govern-
ment interest in national security and foreign policy); Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (holding that the 
ITAR fails to satisfy any requirement for a prior restraint); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11–12 (holding that 
the ITAR serves vital government interests in national security and foreign policy); 22 C.F.R. 
§ 126.7(a)(1) (stating that the DDTC may deny a license to further world peace, national security, 
foreign policy, or whenever “otherwise advisable”). The requirement of a compelling government 
interest is duplicative of the O’Brien test, and is therefore not re-evaluated here. See O’Brien, 391 
U.S. at 376–77 (stating that, in order to be constitutional, a content-neutral restriction on speech must 
further a substantial government interest); Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59 (holding that only prior re-
straints serving an important government interest can be constitutional); see supra notes 239–242 and 
accompanying text (arguing that the ITAR serves a compelling government interest). But see N.Y. 
Times Co., 403 U.S. at 717–18 (Black, J., concurring) (rejecting that national security concerns alone 
justify a prior restraint on publication by the press); Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288 (holding that 
national security alone does not justify a prior restraint). Although it is possible a court could invali-
date the ITAR because of the unlimited time frame for licensing decisions, this deficiency is likely the 
easiest to remedy by passing a new rule limiting the time. See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289. Ac-
cordingly, the remainder of this Note focuses on the more sensitive issues, due to the separation of 
powers and foreign policy concerns. See infra notes 234–257 and accompanying text. 
 234 See United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that judicial review 
is not available to challenge the designation of articles on the USML); United States v. Martinez, 904 
F.2d 601, 602 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the designation of an article on the USML is itself a polit-
ical question). 
 235 See City of Littleton v Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 783 (2004); Bernstein, 945 F. 
Supp. at 1289. 
 236 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (noting that the ITAR provides a list of requirements for 
licensing); 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(2)–(8). The DDTC also has a policy to deny licenses to certain coun-
tries, including, among others, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela. § 126.1(a). 
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DDTC to deny a license to further the policy objectives of world peace, national 
security, foreign policy, or when “otherwise advisable.”237 Even if the national 
security and foreign policy objectives were sufficiently objective, the “whenever 
advisable” ground for denial is precisely the kind of boundless discretion a li-
censing official cannot have.238 
Finally, the ITAR does not specifically address judicial review of licensing 
decisions.239 Although, there is no judicial review of the designation of articles 
on the USML, the designation alone does not preclude the individual from ex-
porting technical data, but rather requires the individual to acquire a license.240 
Nevertheless, the mere designation of an article on the USML infringes on the 
rights of the would-be exporter.241 Absent such a designation, the individual 
would be free to post the technical data, in this case a 3D CAD file, on the Inter-
net.242 
Arguing that the designation itself is an unconstitutional restraint, however, 
is unlikely to prevail because the ITAR represents executive authority at its 
apex.243 Through the AECA, Congress grants the Executive Branch the ability to 
regulate the export of firearms and related technical data, among other things.244 
Accordingly, the ITAR draws on the authority of both the executive and legisla-
tive branches, limiting the circumstances in which judicial review is appropri-
ate.245 Moreover, matters related to foreign affairs are almost exclusively under 
                                                                                                                           
 237 The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.SC. § 2778(a) (2012); 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1). 
 238 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (holding that the ITAR is a “paradigm of standardless discre-
tion”); cf. Littleton, 541 U.S. at 783 (holding that an ordinance made licensing decisions based on suffi-
ciently nondiscretionary criteria such as the applicant’s age, accuracy of the application’s information, 
prior discipline, history of compliance with tax obligations, and authorization to conduct business within 
the state). Denying a license whenever it is “advisable,” as permitted under the ITAR, is a far cry from 
such quantifiable considerations. See Littleton, 541 U.S. at 783; 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1). For instance, a 
DDTC official who disapproves of the use of 3D printers to manufacture firearm components could deny 
an application for export on those grounds, rather than the impact the license would have on the ITAR’s 
policy objectives. See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289; § 126.7(a)(1). 
 239 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1292 n.13 (stating that the AECA precludes judicial review 
only as to the designation of items on the USML, not the licensing decision). 
 240 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h); 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2014). Furthermore, the ITAR does not prohibit the 
export of information already in the public domain. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (stating that tech-
nical data does not include information in the public domain). 
 241 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.6 (defining defense article to include technical data); § 123.1(a) (stating 
that a license is required to export defense articles); see also Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (indicat-
ing that the lack of judicial review for USML designations contributes to the licensing officials’ ex-
cessive discretion under the ITAR). 
 242 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.6; § 123.1(a). 
 243 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (stating that presidential authority is at its greatest when exercised pursuant to a congres-
sional act). 
 244 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2012); 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a). 
 245 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 335–37; see also Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11–
12 (stating that the courts should not review policy judgments by the political branches on matters of 
foreign policy). 
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the purview of Congress and the Executive.246 Therefore, as two Circuit Courts 
of Appeals have already held, the designation of an article on the USML is a po-
litical question, entrusted to the political branches by the Constitution.247 
Although the ITAR is silent as to judicial review of the licensing determina-
tion itself, the Administrative Procedure Act generally permits review of agency 
action.248 Nevertheless, the licensing decision could also fall under the political 
question doctrine, and therefore evade judicial review.249 The applicability of the 
political questions doctrine, however, likely depends on the grounds for deni-
al.250 If, for example, the DDTC denies the license because the applicant failed 
to include information required by the form, there is no political question.251 On 
the other hand, if the DDTC denies an application because it determines denial is 
necessary to advance the policy objectives of the ITAR, the question is likely a 
political one, which courts would decline to decide.252 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (holding that foreign affairs are “so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches” that judicial intervention is rarely appropriate); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 (establishing that Congress has power to regulate foreign commerce, the value of 
foreign currency, and approve treaties with foreign countries); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (stating that 
states cannot enter treaties, impose duties, or make treaties with foreign states); U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 2 (establishing that the President is the commander in chief of the military, and that the President 
can enter treaties with foreign countries and appoint ambassadors). 
 247 See Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1223; Martinez, 904 F.2d at 602; see also Haig, 453 U.S. at 292. 
 248 See The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 
603 (1988) (stating that congressional intent to preclude constitutional challenges must be explicit); 
Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 8–9 (noting that the parties agreed that the AECA’s explicit preclusion of judi-
cial review does not apply to constitutional challenges). 
 249 Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1223; Mar-
tinez, 904 F.2d at 602. The DDTC may deny a license based on its assessment of the article’s effect on 
American foreign policy and national security objectives. 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (2014). As one 
court noted, assessing the extent to which a particular defense article (including technical data) would 
contribute to a foreign country’s military capability is a political question. Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1223. 
 250 Compare 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (stating that the DDTC may deny a license based on foreign 
policy or national security concerns, or when otherwise advisable), with § 126.7(a)(2)–(8) (providing a 
number of objective grounds for denial). The DDTC must inform an applicant of the grounds for de-
nial, unless security or policy warrant otherwise. § 126.7(b). But see Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770 (stat-
ing that requiring a licensing official to state grounds for denial does not cure a defective scheme 
granting the official excessive discretion). 
 251 See Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 433 (holding that issues intimately related to foreign policy and 
national security are non-justiciable political questions); 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(7). Whether the appli-
cant properly filled out the form is not intimately related to concerns of foreign policy. See 
§ 126.7(a)(7); see also Littleton, 541 U.S. at 783 (stating that denying a license based on the appli-
cant’s provision of false information is a sufficiently objective criterion to avoid censorship). The 
DDTC may also deny a license if the applicant has been convicted of certain crimes, another criteria 
the Supreme Court has held to be sufficiently objective. See Littleton, 541 U.S. at 783; § 126.7(4). 
Yet, the scheme at issue in City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. stated that licenses “shall” be 
denied for failing to satisfy these objective criteria. See Littleton, 541 U.S. at 783. The ITAR, by con-
trast, states that the DDTC “may” deny a license if the applicant fails to satisfy a condition. § 126.7(a). 
 252 See Bancoult, 445 F. 3d at 432–33; Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1223; Martinez, 904 F.2d at 602. 
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In sum, the AECA and the ITAR fail to meet the procedural protections set 
out in 1965 in Freedman v. Maryland by the Supreme Court.253 The DDTC has no 
time limit to issue licensing decisions and can deny licenses based on broad, sub-
jective criteria.254 Furthermore, even though Congress did not preclude constitu-
tional challenges to USML designations, the determinations are still likely unre-
viewable under the political question doctrine.255 Similarly, depending on the crite-
ria, the political question doctrine likely precludes judicial review of the ultimate 
licensing decision.256 Ironically, the very act of declining to provide judicial re-
view of licensing decisions renders the regulatory scheme unconstitutional.257 
CONCLUSION 
Utilizing the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) to prohibit 
the dissemination of weapons-related technical data on the Internet places criti-
cal government interests in national security and foreign policy at odds with the 
First Amendment. The ITAR’s limitations conform to the two most reviled types 
of restrictions on free speech: it is both content-based and a prior restraint. Alt-
hough content-based restrictions are typically strictly scrutinized, courts should 
apply only intermediate scrutiny to the ITAR, because the regulations exist to 
address the secondary effects associated with the proliferation of weapons and 
weapons-related technical data. 
The ITAR’s procedural deficiencies as a prior restraint, however, are far 
more problematic. The Constitution requires that licensing decisions that restrict 
speech must be subject to judicial review. Yet, under the political question doc-
trine, courts routinely decline to decide matters intimately connected with for-
eign policy and national security. Foreign policy and national security determi-
nations are non-justiciable political questions, but simultaneously, the lack of 
                                                                                                                           
 253 See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59; see also FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227–28 (stating that the lim-
ited period of time for licensing decisions and the availability of judicial review are essential to save a 
prior restraint from constitutional infirmity); Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (holding that the ITAR 
fails to satisfy the Freedman factors). 
 254 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289. 
 255 See Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1223 (holding that decisions made by the political branches’ that are 
intimately related to foreign policy and national security are non-justiciable); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 
11–12 (indicating that the determination concerning a particular article would meaningfully affect a 
foreign country’s military capabilities and therefore is intimately connected to foreign policy and 
national security). 
 256 See Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1223 (holding that matters of foreign policy and national security are 
not subject to judicial review); Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11–12 (holding that the DDTC’s determination 
that a particular article would impact the AECA’s foreign policy and national security objectives is a 
non-justiciable political question). 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(1) (2014). 
 257 See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227–28 (stating that licensing schemes restricting speech must be 
subject to judicial review); Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59 (stating that prior restraints are only justified 
if the government bears the burden of proof, showing that objective criteria govern licensing decisions 
and that such decisions are subject to judicial review); Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1289 (holding that 
the ITAR fails to satisfy each of the Freedman criteria). 
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judicial review renders the regulatory scheme an unconstitutional prior restraint. 
Because the ITAR’s explicit purpose is to advance foreign policy and national 
security, the intersection of the ITAR and the First Amendment creates a consti-
tutional catch-22. 
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